Does Tort Reform Affect The Market For Lawyers? Evidence From The U.s States. by Camara, Ablaye
Wayne State University
Wayne State University Dissertations
1-1-2017
Does Tort Reform Affect The Market For Lawyers?
Evidence From The U.s States.
Ablaye Camara
Wayne State University,
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations
Part of the Labor Economics Commons, and the Law Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Wayne State University Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Camara, Ablaye, "Does Tort Reform Affect The Market For Lawyers? Evidence From The U.s States." (2017). Wayne State University
Dissertations. 1687.
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1687
  
 
DOES TORT REFORM AFFECT THE MARKET FOR LAWYERS? EVIDENCE FROM 
THE U.S STATES 
 
by 
ABLAYE CAMARA 
DISSERTATION 
Submitted to the Graduate School 
of Wayne State University, 
Detroit, Michigan 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
       2017 
MAJOR: ECONOMICS   
      Approved By: 
      _________________________________________ 
      Advisor     Date 
      _________________________________________ 
      _________________________________________ 
      _________________________________________ 
      _________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© COPYRIGHT BY 
ABLAYE CAMARA 
2017 
All Rights Reserved
   
ii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
To our brother Zuzu, 
And to our father Papa. 
You left the biggest space in our hearts. 
A notre frere ZuZu, 
Et a notre pere Papa 
Vous avez laissez un espace enorme dans nos coeurs.  
   
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
  
I would like to thank my advisor and committee chair, Dr. Stephen J. Spurr, for 
his expertise, support and patience. 
I would like to thank the economics department (faculty and staff) for giving me 
the opportunity to excel. 
I would like to thank Dr. Li Way Lee and my committee members Dr. Jennifer 
Ward-Batts, Dr. Xu Lin, and Dr. David Merolla for their availability and support. 
I would like to thank my family, friends and colleagues for their support, 
understanding, and cooperation.    
   
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE .....................................................................1 
CHAPTER 2 THEORY OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR LAWYERS ....................................3 
2.1 Demand for Lawyers..................................................................................................................3 
2.2 Supply of Lawyers .....................................................................................................................5 
2.3 Equilibrium in the Market for Lawyers  ....................................................................................6 
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW ..........................................................................................9 
3.1 Non-Tort Determinants of the Market for Lawyers  ..................................................................9 
3.2 Tort Determinants of the Market for Lawyers  ........................................................................14 
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................22 
4.1 Data ..........................................................................................................................................22 
4.2 Non-Tort Variables ..................................................................................................................22 
4.3 Tort Reform Variables .............................................................................................................28 
CHAPTER 5  THE  MODEL ........................................................................................................33 
5.1 Model Specifications ...............................................................................................................35 
CHAPTER 6   THE NUMBER OF LAWYERS ...........................................................................37 
6.1 Estimation ................................................................................................................................37 
6.2 Results ......................................................................................................................................44 
6.2.1 Non-tort Variables ................................................................................................................44 
   
v 
 
6.2.2 Tort reform Variables ...........................................................................................................47 
6.2.3 Other Estimations..................................................................................................................48 
6.3 Lagged Effects of Tort Reform Variables ...............................................................................50 
CHAPTER 7 THE EARNINGS OF LAWYERS ..........................................................................51 
7.1 Estimation ................................................................................................................................51 
7.2 Results ......................................................................................................................................54 
7.2.1 Non-tort Variables ................................................................................................................54 
7.2.2 Tort reform Variables ...........................................................................................................56 
7.2.3 The impacts of All Torts .......................................................................................................58 
CHAPTER 8 CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION ..........................................................................61 
8.1 Critique ....................................................................................................................................61 
8.2 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................61 
APPENDIX A THE STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE US ...............................65 
A.  The Number of Lawyers per Capita .........................................................................................65 
B.  Lawyers Demographics ............................................................................................................66 
C. The Number of First-year Law Students ...................................................................................68 
D. Employment and Salary Trends for New Lawyers ...................................................................69 
E. Earnings of Lawyers by firm Size .............................................................................................70 
F. Earnings of Lawyers by Geography ..........................................................................................71 
G. Law Firms Revenues .................................................................................................................74 
APPENDIX B TABLES AND FIGURES .....................................................................................76 
APPENDIX C ESTIMATION RESULTS ....................................................................................82 
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................87 
   
vi 
 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................94 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT ......................................................................................96 
   
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Description of Variables ..................................................................................................76 
Table 2: Summary Statistics (Non-tort Variables) .........................................................................77 
Table3: Summary Statistics (Tort Variables) ................................................................................77 
Table 4: Elasticities: Number of Lawyers per 100,000 people (FGLS) ........................................37 
Table 5: Elasticities1: Number of Lawyers per 100,000 people (PCSE) .......................................41 
Table 6: Elasticities1 Number of Lawyers (Other Estimations PCSE) ..........................................48 
Table 7: Elasticities1: Real Earnings of Lawyers (FE) ..................................................................51 
Table 8: Elasticities Impact of all Tort Reforms ............................................................................58 
Table 9: Correlation Matrix ...........................................................................................................78 
Table 10: Elasticities 1- Number of Lawyers and US GDP per Capita .........................................65 
Table 11: Legal education and Admission to Bar ..........................................................................68 
Table 12:  Salary Trends for New Lawyers ...................................................................................69 
Table 13: Median Starting Salaries for First Year Lawyers ..........................................................71 
Table 14: Median Starting Salary for First Year Lawyers in the Largest Firms ...........................72 
Table 15: Revenues of Offices of Lawyers....................................................................................74 
                                                 
1 Calculation based on Alternative Earnings.  
   
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 The market for Lawyers  ...................................................................................................3 
Figure 2 Number of Lawyers and real GDP per Capita (Log) ......................................................78 
Figure 3 Log of Number of Lawyers (Country mean) ...................................................................79 
Figure 4 Log of Median Earnings of Lawyers (Country mean) ....................................................79 
Figure 5 Log of Median Earnings of Alternative Professions (Country mean) .............................80 
Figure 6 Log of Median Earnings of Bachelor Degree Holders (Country mean  ..........................80 
Figure 7 Distribution of the Number of Lawyers ..........................................................................81 
Figure 8 Distribution of the Earnings of Lawyers .........................................................................81 
 
1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE 
In the United States and in most Western nations, economic advancement and the creation 
of wealth and prosperity have been based on established legal systems that provided protection for 
all the market’s participants (individual, businesses, and governments). These legal systems made 
changes based on the evolution of the societies as they strengthened the rights of individuals. One 
feature of those legal systems is called “Tort.” Tort is defined as a wrongful act, not including a 
breach of contract or trust, that results in injury to another’s person, property, reputation, or the 
like, and for which the injured party is entitled to compensation. The laws of torts have provided 
a way for consumers to be awarded for damages caused to them by other parties (individuals, 
businesses, governments).  
In the United States, this system has long benefited both plaintiffs and their lawyers 
because the awards were subjectively decided by the jury. Therefore, many organizations 
(hospitals, individual doctors) that are subject to these lawsuits, buy sometimes high cost insurance 
to mitigate the risk associated with their practice. A study has shown that because of high insurance 
cost, some physicians either stop practice or relocate to particular states where insurance premiums 
are not as high (Mello et al. 2005). This study also asserts that physicians, who remain in a 
particular state, reduce their willingness to undertake high risk-procedures (obstetrics, back 
surgery).  
Between 1940 and 2010 the Number of Lawyers in the United States increased by more 
than 6 folds while the population of the United States only increased by 2.3 folds (Table 10 
Appendix A). Thus, the Number of Lawyers per Capita nearly tripled in those 70 years. However, 
during the period between 1980 and 2010, characterized by many legal reforms (tort reforms), the 
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Number of Lawyers per Capita increased only by a factor of 1.56 although Real GDP per Capita 
increased by a factor of nearly 1.7. 
Since many state legislatures adopted tort reforms, research has focused on the impact of 
these law changes on insurance market variables including insurance costs, frequency of claims, 
claim amounts, and sometimes on the physicians’ market. Some studies have shown that some tort 
reforms such as the Caps on Noneconomic Damages increased the number of physicians in a state 
(Jonathan Click and Thomas Stratmann, 2005 Kessler et al. 2005). Others have investigated the 
impact of tort reform on the health outcome. Shepherd (2008) looked at the impacts of tort reforms 
on the death rates and concluded that tort reforms in one state are associated with increased deaths 
in neighboring non-tort reform states. 
However, this study explores a different aspect of these law changes; their impacts on the 
market for lawyers. Because tort lawsuits generally require the services of attorneys, the demand 
for lawyers in a state should depend to some extent not only on the number of expected recoveries 
for torts, but also on the expected recovery per lawsuit. This study is designed to investigate the 
determinants of the market for lawyers as previously done by Peter Pashigian (1977) although the 
emphasis will be on the demand variables. The study will examine the impact of these reforms not 
only on the Number of Lawyers but also on the Earnings of Lawyers. 
My hypothesis is that tort reforms that put caps on awards, as well as other measures that 
favor defendants, will (1) affect the Number of Lawyers demanded and therefore the equilibrium 
number of lawyers, and (2) affect the Earnings of Lawyers. 
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CHAPTER 2 THEORY OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR LAWYERS  
This section develops the theoretical model of the market for lawyers. In studying the 
market for lawyers, I assumed that the equilibrium Number of Lawyers and the Earnings are 
determined by the general theory of supply and demand as previously done by Pashigian (1977) 
and Pashigian (1978). The figure below from Pashigian (1978) illustrates the multiple relationships 
between all the variables described in this section.   
  
 
Figure 1:  The Market for Lawyers Pashigian (1978)  
  
2.1. Demand for Lawyers  
The demand for a good or service represents the relationship between the prices of a good 
(or service) and the quantity demanded. The demand curve generally slopes downward as it reflects 
the negative relationship between price and quantity demanded.  
The demand for lawyers is assumed to behave per this general theory. Pashigian (1978) 
assumed that the demand for lawyers depended inversely on the annual Earnings of Lawyers. Other 
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things equal, as the Earnings of Lawyers increases, individuals, businesses, and governments will 
reduce the quantity demanded of legal services. Individuals, firms, and government institutions 
hire lawyers to represent them in litigation, contract drafting, negotiation, representation, etc. 
However, these economic agents must take into consideration the compensation required by the 
lawyers and law firms for the services being rendered. At high level of compensation, the above-
mentioned economic agents reduce their quantity of legal services demanded. This is represented 
by a movement along the DD demand curve (figure 1).   
The demand for a good or service also depends on a set of exogenous variables. A change 
in the exogenous variables, such as the number of buyers, the price of related goods, expectation 
of future prices, and income, lead to a shift of the demand curve.  
In the market for lawyers, the exogenous determinants include the amount of transactions 
of consumers, businesses and governments in which lawyers are likely needed. These include 
proxy variables such as housing mortgage loans, divorce, real losses paid by insurance companies, 
real gross national product, the number of active corporations, the number of new cases filed in 
federal district courts, the number of bankruptcies filed and the total real budget of federal 
regulatory agencies (Pashigian 1977). Theoretically, any change in one these variables leads to 
shift in the demand curve from DD to D’D’ or from DD’ to DD. For instance, Pashigian (1978) 
argued that real gross national product is directly related to the quantity demanded of lawyers. An 
increase in the gross national product leads to a rightward shift in the demand for lawyers. This 
means that the quantity demanded for lawyers will increase at every price (earnings) levels.  
Formally, the demand for lawyers can be represented by the following function: 
Q = f (E, A) and QD = A – a* E (linear form)  
dQ/d(Earnings) < 0 and dQ/d(A) = x (all real numbers), 
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 where Q= Quantity Demanded of Lawyers; E = Earnings of Lawyers; A = Exogenous Variables.   
2.2. Supply of Lawyers   
Supply describes the relationship between the price of a good and the quantity supplied. 
Based on the law of supply, this curve generally slopes upward indicating that the quantity supplied 
of a good rise when the price of the good increases. For lawyers’ market, an increase in the 
Earnings of Lawyers induces lawyers to supply more labor. This represents a movement along the 
supply curve.  
Just like the demand curve, the supply curve also depends on a set of exogenous variables 
such as technology and input prices. Changes in these variables shift the supply curve. Formally, 
the supply of lawyers can be represented by: 
QS = f (E, B) and QS = B + b* E (linear form) 
dQ/d(Earnings) > 0.  dQ/d(A) = x belongs to {R}, 
where Q= quantity supplied of lawyers; E = earnings of lawyers; B = Exogenous variables.   
Per Pashigian (1978), the shape of the supply curve for lawyers depends on the time 
horizon. He suggested that supply L1 of lawyers in the short run is perfectly inelastic or vertical. 
In the short term the Number of Lawyers may not be responsive to the change in wages. The author 
noted that this is an approximation and that there is a possibility that some former lawyers may 
revert into the law profession if the offer (earnings) for lawyers is larger than the earnings of their 
current professions.  
Pashigian assumed the long-run supply curve to be perfectly elastic or horizontal. 
Therefore, over the relevant range of price, no change is necessary for the quantity supplied of 
lawyers to increase. Pashigian explained this by the fact that law schools will continue to confer 
degrees to graduates who eventually pass the bar exam for potential future practice. This is true in 
6 
 
 
 
that students that are already in law schoo, do not need another incentive (higher earnings for 
lawyers) to become lawyers. The decision to go to law school had already been made based on 
many determinants including the three-year lagged value of earnings in other professions. 
Short-run movements in quantity supplied happen along the short run vertical supply curve 
as more or less licensed lawyers readily compete for open positions. However, movements along 
the long-run supply curve may take years. For instance, Pashigian suggested that a “50% increase 
in the number of lawyers could take 15 to 20 years depending   on how rapidly the number of 
enrollments in law schools increased.” 
Although the movement along the long-run supply curve is not rapid, the level of this 
supply curve depends on the Earnings of Four-year Degree Holders. The level corresponds to a 
point where the earnings offered to lawyers is equal to the three-year discounted value of the 
Earnings of Bachelor Degree Holders (Pashigian 1978). At this level, a person will be indifferent 
between going to law school and getting a job right after the four-year degree. 
2.3. Equilibrium in the Market for Lawyers 
The equilibrium price or market-clearing price indicates the price at which the quantity 
demanded is equal to the quantity supplied of the good. In the market for lawyers, the demand 
curve slopes downward while the supply curve is “approximately” vertical (perfectly inelastic) in 
the short run and horizontal (perfectly elastic) in the long run. 
In the short run, the equilibrium Earnings of Lawyers and the Number of Lawyers are 
determined at the intersection between the downward sloping demand curve DD and the short run 
vertical supply curve L1. At this level, as Pashigian (1978) noted, the Earnings of Lawyers is 
assumed equal to the three-year discounted value of the Earnings of Bachelor Degree Holders. 
Theoretically, at this point, the wages offered to lawyers make it so that the Number of Lawyers 
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demanded and the Number of Lawyers supplied, are equal. But this state of equilibrium can be 
disturbed by events that shift the demand curve, the supply curve, or both curves simultaneously. 
A change in any exogenous variable will lead to a new short run equilibrium. However, a long-run 
equilibrium will be eventually reached after a time of adjustment. This adjustment will happen 
along the demand curve (Pashigian 1978). 
For instance, a change in law that shifts the demand curve to the left leads to a new 
equilibrium where the Earnings of Lawyers will go below the equilibrium earnings. This level of 
earnings is less than the discounted value of the Earnings of Bachelor Degree Holders. New 
students will find professions requiring just a college degree more attractive than law school. This 
will decrease the number of students going to law school and eventually the number of new law 
graduates three years later. The Number of Lawyers will continue to decrease until the Earnings 
of Lawyers rise to equal the discounted value of the Earnings of Bachelor Degree Holders. This 
point becomes the new short run equilibrium with a new vertical supply of lawyers. These multiple 
short run equilibria will indicate the earnings LEe at which students will be indifferent between 
law school and a job right after college. It is a level at which the long run supply curve SS will be 
located. 
An increase in demand was illustrated by Pashigian (1978) showing that the short run 
equilibrium shifts to a point above the discounted value of the Earnings of Bachelor Degree 
Holders. At this point the author suggests that law becomes attractive to new students who will 
enroll to increase the supply of lawyers three years later. As supply increases, the Number of 
Lawyers increases through the adjustment process which pushes the Earnings of Lawyers down 
towards the discounted value of the Earnings of Bachelor Degree Holders. Pashigian specified that 
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the speed of adjustment to reaching this new equilibrium depends on whether the change is 
permanent and on how fast law schools can respond to the changes in the market. 
Pashigian asserted that although this model can be refined by considering the experience 
of lawyers, and the depreciation rate (death and retirement) of lawyers, “the direction of the change 
in the number of lawyers due to the shift in demand is clear.” Therefore, if I consider the supply 
curve to be “approximately” perfectly inelastic or perfectly inelastic, an increase in demand should 
have increasing effects on the Number of Lawyers and the Earnings of Lawyers. Also, events, such 
as tort reforms that decrease demand, should have decreasing effects on both the Number of 
Lawyers and the Earnings of Lawyers. Although these changes in the Number of Lawyers are 
going to be relatively low because of the extreme inelasticity (steepness) of the supply curve, the 
changes in the Earnings of Lawyers may be substantial. However, events that lead to the shifts in 
the supply curve will have the opposite effects. In this case, the market may experience a change 
in the Number of Lawyers with relatively smaller changes in the Earnings of Lawyers.  
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper focuses on the determinants of supply and demand in a new context that 
considers all the legal reforms that have taken place in the last three decades. In fact, relatively 
little research has been done on the determinants of supply and demand of lawyers although there 
is a growing literature on the impact of tort reform. Freeman (1975), Pashigian (1977) and 
Pashigian (1978) are some of the few papers addressing this topic of the “Determinants of the 
Market for Lawyers” in the context of interest to this paper. 
3.1. Non-Tort Determinants of the Market for Lawyers 
Richard B. Freeman (1975) used an incomplete data set between 1929 and 1970 to apply a 
recursive model of supply and salary adjustments to the market of lawyers. Looking closely at the 
data, the author noticed cyclical fluctuations of law school enrollments although the number of 
college graduates with Bachelor degrees fluctuated with “peak to trough” of about 4 to 5 years. He 
characterized these fluctuations to be of a “cobweb” type as they created endogeneity between the 
number of graduates and first year enrollments. Freeman however noted that these fluctuations can 
also be due to other exogenous variables. As measures of the demand for legal services, Freeman 
used the ratio of consumer spending on legal services to total expenditures and the legal service 
share of the Gross National Product. Using the data, he noted that the legal profession experienced 
some fluctuations during the period of 1929-1970. The profession suffered less than other fields 
during the beginning of the “Great Depression” although it expanded less rapidly than other sectors 
during World War II. The profession however, experienced significant growth after World War II. 
To account for all these changes in the market for lawyers, Freeman used a recursive model 
of supply and salary adjustments. Freeman used the sum of the number of new entrants and the 
number of graduates as the total supply of lawyers. On the demand side, he used the number of 
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LLBs (Legum Baccalaureus) although he differentiated between the stock and flow of lawyers. 
Since the “stock model” allows for perfect “substitutability” between experienced lawyers and 
new lawyers, the author assumed that the recursive method will lead to endogeneity between the 
salaries and the number of graduates and therefore the number of first year students. Although 
Freeman suggested that more complex models may lead to better results, he used a model that 
consisted of three equations: 
 Equation (A): The number of first-year enrollees as a function of the number of new entrants 
in the previous year, the salary of young attorneys and the salaries of professional workers. 
 Equation (B): Supply of graduates was a function of the number of new entrants at t-3, the 
salaries of young attorneys and alternative occupations at t-2, and t-1.  
 Equation (C): Salary determination was a function of the number of LLB (stock), of law school 
graduates (flow) and the output of legal services. 
Freeman used both the least square and the non-linear search procedures to estimate these 
equations. The OLS estimations of equations (A) and (B) indicated that the salaries of young 
attorneys, along with that of “salaried professionals” explained about 50% of the changes in the 
number of first year students. The elasticity of the number of students entering law school with 
respect to the salaries of lawyers was approximately equal to 1 in the short run and between 3 and 
4 in the long run. These results were questionable as Freeman recognized, since the estimations 
were subject to considerable serial correlation of the residuals. Therefore, he used a partial 
adjustment model by adding the lagged number of new enrollees and a nonlinear search method 
for better specifications and to control for serial correlation. These specifications revealed a 
negative but small coefficient of alternative occupation salaries. Freeman concluded that it may be 
revealing that neither of the two salaries were correct measures of variables that enter the decisions 
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to enter law school. For the closeness of the two coefficients, the author, however, was not able to 
reject the hypothesis that both of those variables (salary of young attorneys and alternative 
occupation) had the same effects on the decision to enter law school. 
Freeman extended the estimation by adding the number of men in the military and the 
unemployment rate as proxies for the draft of the business cycle. These variables can test the effect 
of external shocks on this market. Both variables proved to be insignificant. Freeman concluded 
in this model that the changes in supply had been mainly motivated by the desire to study law and 
not any other exogenous variables. He also concluded that the stock of LLBs had a negative, 
significant, and sizable impact on lawyer salaries when the alternative wages were part of the 
model. Using the cobweb estimation, the OLS results indicated that 1% increase in law school 
graduates reduced enrollment by 0.4%.  Salaries of new attorneys and alternative occupations 
seemed to have a joint effect with non-negligible coefficients. 
Peter Pashigian used data from 1920 to 1970 to study the determinants of demand and 
supply of lawyers using an adaptive expectation theory and the Hildrith-Lu search process. His 
model was initiated from the point of view of the demand supply for legal services. Using those 
simple equations, Pashigian came up with reduced forms for the Number of Lawyers, the number 
of First-year law students, and the number of those newly admitted to the bar, as functions of the 
number of lawyers in the previous period, the income of college graduates at time t-3, and series 
of exogenous variables at time t-3. The equations are the following: 
 
, 
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, 
. 
In the above formulas Omega (ω) is the speed of adjustment to changes in the demand of 
lawyers. If Omega =1 the actual number of first year law students equals the equilibrium number 
of new lawyers. Lt, NAt , Ft   respectively  represent the Number of Lawyers, the Number of new 
admissions to the Bar and the number of First Year Students at time t-3.  Small cap (d) represents 
the depreciation rate which quantifies death and attrition rates. Small ct is the portion of the First-
year students who have completed law school and passed the Bar exam. However, the discounted 
value of the Earnings of the College Graduate is:    
(1 + r)3 Ht t-3 Ut , 
 where r is the interest rate is Ut is the Earnings. For Ht, the author developed a comprehensive 
equation that involved probabilities of completing the school and that of passing the Bar (see 
Pashigian 1977).  Zt represents the series of exogenous variables which were classified in three 
categories: 
1. Consumer: Nonfarm housing mortgage loans to measure the volume of transaction, Real 
losses incurred by insurance companies in automobile accidents 
2. Business: Gross national product, Number of active firms. 
3. Judicial and regulatory activity court activity Federal regulatory agency budgets. 
Pashigian evaluated the equation of the Number of Lawyers with the assumption that the 
predicted values for forecasted variables are equal to their realized values. He justified the above 
estimation because the series were “smooth’ and that errors associated were likely to be small. 
Using the Hildrith-Lu search method that minimizes the sum of the squared errors, he estimated 
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the equations of the number of lawyers and the new admissions. He found that the Number of 
Lawyers at time t -1 is positively related to the Number of Lawyers at time t and negatively related 
to the number of new admissions. He mentioned that the coefficients were consistent with a very 
slow adjustment process with values of omega between 0.03 and 0.17. 
Pashigian found that a rise in “Earnings per Full-time Employee (all industries)” decreases 
the Number of Lawyers with a real “product elasticity”2 of 0.52. This means that 1% increase in 
“Earnings per Full time Employee” (all industries) leads to 0.52% decrease in the Number of 
Lawyers. Given this level of earnings outside of the legal profession, Pashigian concluded that an 
increase in Real Gross National Product per Capita also reduced the Number of Lawyers through 
a rise in opportunities offered in the overall private sector (product elasticity of 1.52). However, 
the results of the estimations show that Gross National Product was the most important determinant 
of the demand for lawyers with a product elasticity of 1.80. 
Pashigian also found that the Divorce Rate was statistically significant even though the 
coefficient was very small and its product elasticity was 0.32. Additionally, he found that the 
number of court cases was positively related to the demand for lawyers and that this was an 
important determinant in the market for lawyers only if Gross National Product per capita was 
excluded. Moreover, when he used the budget for regulatory agencies as the proxy for regulatory 
activities, it resulted in a positive impact on the number of lawyers demanded. Finally, Pashigian 
found that the number of active corporations was a rather unclear determinant of the demand for 
lawyers while the insurance losses were not significant. Although, he noted the significance of 
other variables, he found that the Gross National Product was the most important determinant of 
the demand for lawyers. 
                                                 
2 Elasticity measured at the mean value of the variable (Pashigian 1977).  
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Herbert M. Kritzer (1999) considered multiple issues that were shaking the institutional 
foundations of the legal profession in the U.S. He found that the legal profession, despite its 
successes in litigation (tobacco, firearms), was increasingly facing such challenges as 
multidisciplinary professional practices, encroachments by a variety of service providers 
(accountants, consultants, paralegal) and political pressure. The latter is attributed to the fact that 
lawyers are viewed as “greedy and arrogant.” Many of the services rendered by lawyers can in 
some way be provided by other professionals. Therefore, the Kritzer concluded that all these 
factors were leading the U.S to a period in which this profession may be in decline, which he called 
a “post-professional era.” 
3.2. Tort Determinants of the Market for Lawyers  
Although I found only one academic article directly linking tort reform to the number of 
lawyers by Browne and Schmit (2008), some papers have linked tort reforms to topics and issues 
that may have implicit or indirect impact on the market for lawyers. 
Browne and Schmit (2008) used third-party automobile bodily injury liability claims data 
from the American Institute for Chartered Property Casualty Underwriters and the Insurance 
Institute of America to analyze the changes in the use of attorneys and claims filings. The study 
consisted of claims data, with closed payment between the period 1977 and 1997, provided by 
insurance companies that account for more than 60% of the automobile insurance market including 
State Farm and All State. The authors conducted the study by estimating a two-stage logistical 
regression model in which the first equation was that of the likelihood of hiring a lawyer when the 
plaintiff requests compensation from the defendant. The second equation, which contained the first 
equation as an explanatory variable, was that of the likelihood of filing a claim. The authors also 
included a vector of demographic variables to control for differences in resource availability, in 
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attitude towards risk, and biases associated with gender. They additionally classified injuries per 
the severity based on two measures. The first measure, done by the claim adjuster, classifies the 
claimants as temporary disable, permanent partial-disable, permanent total-disable, and not-
disable. The second classification consists of the claimants being scored based on the relative value 
of the medical expenses with respect to the average medical expenses of all claimants for the year. 
The authors moreover used analyses based on state identifiers to address the collinearity issue with 
tort reform within the data. The authors finally analyzed the data by including both state identifiers 
and interaction terms between reforms and other variables.  
The estimations concluded that both tort reforms and the year variables were significantly 
correlated with the use of attorneys and claim filings. They further asserted that, with exception to 
the No-Fault Reform that had a positive impact, tort reforms performed as expected by theory as 
they “dampened” the increase in the use of attorneys and claim filings during the period of 1977-
1997. The time fixed effect estimation revealed that attorney use was slightly higher in 1997 than 
1987 and that claim filings were higher in 1977. The results for state identifiers indicated that it 
was a better fit model than that of tort variables alone. The results for the third model show that 
attorney use increased between 1977 and 1997 while claim filings increased between 1977 and 
1987. Although the coefficients were smaller for year 1977, most reforms had performed according 
to expectation. With exception to No-Fault and Punitive Damages Caps, which showed mixed 
effects, these tort reform laws decreased the use of attorneys and claim filings. Overall, the authors 
asserted that the results of the research suggest that “tort reforms generally have been successful 
in achieving their stated goals of dampening litigation.” 
Gracer et al. (2012) studied the impact of tort reform statuses based on their 
constitutionality and found that permanent tort reform lowered the medical malpractice insurance 
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losses and premiums. It also increased the profitability of the insurance companies. They however 
found no significant impact of temporary tort reforms on these variables. They concluded that the 
impact of tort reform depended on whether it would be challenged. 
Lee and Schmit (1994) tested the impact of Joint and Several Liability Reform on the 
frequency of tort case filings by using the National Center for State Courts data from 19 states over 
a period of six years (1987-1989). They regressed the number of tort filings on three tort-related 
dummy3 variables and a set of control variables. The first tort variable consists of whether the state 
had a Joint and Several Lability at the time of the enactment of the reform (abolition of the law). 
The second considers whether the state was partially applying Joint and Several Liability at the 
time of the enactment of the reform. The third consists of whether the state had other reforms in 
effect at the time of the enactment of the reform.  
For good estimation, Lee and Schmit (1994) used the Number of Lawyers per Capita, 
Population living in urban areas, Population density, Surgical operations per capita, Vehicle miles 
of travel per mile of roadway, No-fault insurance law and State unemployment   rate as control 
variables. They estimated three equations of which the first does not have a time control variables. 
The second equation includes the year at which the law was passed to control for the surge in the 
number of claims that occurred by the deadline of the “pre-reform4.” The third includes the lagged 
variable for the Joint and Several Liability to control for all possible legal challenges that the 
reform may face before full implementation. 
The authors found that the models explained more than 60% of the changes in claim filings 
and that the population density was a more significant predictor of the Number of filings than the 
Number of lawyers per capita or the number of people living in urban areas. Although they found 
                                                 
3 Variables that take the value of 1 if statement is true and 0 other wise.   
4 Period before the Joint and Several Liability Rules reform are implemented.  
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that other “tort reforms” were not statistically correlated with the number of claim filings, the 
authors contended that Joint and Several Liability is a statistically significant determinant of the 
number claim filings. They also found that the number of claims did not increase in states that 
abolished Joint and Several Liability. However, this increase in the rate of claim filings may have 
been a response to the enactment of the law. The authors finally explained these results by that 
Joint and Several Liability, at the time, was a more recent law and that its effects were not known 
yet. Their also asserted that Joint and Several Liability claims were just a portion of the total 
claims, that laws were too weak and that the enactment of the laws decrease the deterrent effect by 
increasing the number if injuries. 
Browne and Puelz (1996) used a large sample of individual bodily injury liability claims 
from 21 states collected by a major insurance firm to test the marginal impact of tort reforms on 
the number of claims and their severity. Although 10% of the claims were opened before 1989, 
they were all paid and closed in 1989. The authors estimated the impact of these tort reforms using 
a log linear regression model with the net individual loss 5  as the dependent variable. The 
independent variables include the tort dummy variables consisting of the Joint and Several 
Liability, Collateral Source Rule, Noneconomic Damages, and Punitive Damages. Another 
independent variable called Minor Reforms6, which is a count variable, represents the number of 
already implemented reforms at the time of the loss. Browne and Puelz also included the Verbal 
                                                 
5 Net individual loss is the total claim cost less administrative and investigative expenses (Browne and Puelz 
1996).  Net individual loss is normalized using the average cost of a semi-private room in the state in which the loss 
occurred.   
6 Minor Reforms = Prejudgment interest, provisions for periodic payment, sanctions on frivolous lawsuits 
or defenses.   
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threshold7, the Low dollar threshold8 and the High dollar threshold9 to control for the type of No-
fault policy existing in the state. They finally included variables like the degree of urbanization, 
the unemployment rate, the injury type, the duration (opening to close) of the claim and policy 
type (personal coverage or commercial coverage).  
Browne and Puelz found that “attorney use” in claims procedure was associated with larger 
loss payment with elasticity of 64. They explained this effect in that lawyers can educate their 
clients on how to maximize the amount of the settlement. They also found that Noneconomic 
Damages are correlated with reduced claim severity with an elasticity of 62. But Joint and Several 
Liability was associated with an increase in the severity of claims. Partial differentiation of the 
model revealed that Punitive Damages are associated with a reduction in claim severity by 40%. 
However, claim severity is increased by 126% when partial differentiation is applied to the 
“insurable Punitive Damages. “Although the majority of the control variables were significant, 
they finally found that the Low Dollar Threshold and the Minor Reforms were associated with 
increase in claim sizes with respective elasticities of 27 and 115. 
Ronen Avraham (2007) studied the impact of six tort reforms on the frequency, size and 
number of total annual settlements in medical malpractice cases between 1991 and 1998 collected 
from the National Practitioner Data Bank. To avoid overrepresentation of settled cases, and outlier 
issues with cases involving smaller damages, the author only considered settlements in 50 states 
between the periods of 1991 and 1998 although the original data span to 2005. He estimated the 
effects of medical malpractice reforms on the size of individual payments using December 2005 
as the base year.  He also estimated their effects on the sum of payments per doctor, a state-level 
                                                 
7 Verbal Threshold: Lawsuits are allowed only in severe cases (death, dismemberment, disfigurement, loss 
of body function).  
8 Low Dollar Threshold: Compensatory damages can be lower than 1000 dollars.  9 High dollar Threshold: 
Compensatory damages are greater than 1000 dollars.  
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variable that measures the total payment per state per year. Avraham extended the estimation to 
seek the effects of these reforms on the number of cases per thousand doctors, a measure of 
frequency of medical malpractice payments. The author used five different variations of the tort 
variables by collapsing them by category. In the last estimation, the author collapsed all of the tort 
reforms together although he noted that this might provide a bias effect without any distinction 
between the individual effects. 
With the state-level analysis of the model, Avraham found that the Caps on Pain and 
Suffering Damages as well as the Periodic Payment were associated with a 10 to 13% reduction 
in the number of cases and 15% to 20% reduction in total annual payment per doctor although the 
latter was only significant in one of the models used. However, Avraham found that Joint and 
Several Liability Reform was statistically significant in decreasing the number of cases by 8 to 9% 
while Periodic Payment decreased it by 5 to 7%. He concluded that the rest of tort reforms, 
including the Caps on Noneconomic Damages were not statistically significant. He also noted that 
the joint effect of all the six tort reforms reduced the number of cases but not the average awards. 
Finally, Avraham used a data composed of 100,000 individual cases for 50 states over a 
period of eighth years to test the model at the individual level. He found that Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages decreased the average awards per settlements with an elasticity of 65 to74. He also found 
that Collateral Source Reform decreased the average awards per settlements by 17 to 32% while 
Periodic Payment decreased this average by 38 to 54%. However, Avraham found that Joint and 
Several Liability and Caps on Punitive Damages, though not statistically significant, increased the 
average awards per settlement. 
Rubin and Shepherd (2007) explored a theory that tort reform could increase accidents 
because the Tortfeasor, who internalizes the cost,  has less incentive to reduce risks or decrease 
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accidents because lower prices could lead to the purchase of risk reducing products. The authors 
tested this theory by studying a state level panel data set of non-motor vehicle accidental death 
rates between 1981 and 2000. They provided the results of two estimations. In the first estimation, 
they compared the death rates of “before tort reform” to the death rates of “after tort reform.” In 
the second estimation, the authors compared the death rates of non-tort reform states to those of 
the tort reform states. 
Analyzing these death rates, Rubin and Shepherd asserted that death rates clearly decreased 
in the years during which five of the seven tort reform laws were passed and implemented. They 
also noted that there was a larger increase or a smaller decrease in these death rates in the years 
following the passage of five of the seven tort reform laws. In the model, they included variables 
to control for race, age, gender, employment status and income. The results suggest that Caps on 
Noneconomic Damages, Caps on Punitive Damages, a higher Evidence standard for Punitive 
Damages and Prejudgment Interest Reform are all negatively correlated with accidental death 
rates. However, they found that Collateral Source Rule was associated with increased deaths, 
which Rubin and Shepherd explained by the negative sum of “externality-increasing effect9 and 
the safety-increasing effect10.” Finally, in calculating the real coefficients of these effects, Rubin 
and Shepherd concluded that tort reforms can be associated with about 2000 fewer deaths in year 
2000 and 24000 between years 1981 and 2000. 
Born et al. (2009) evaluated the effects of tort reforms on the profitability of insurance 
companies by using data collected by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. These 
data from a sample of medical malpractice insurance writings between 1984 and 2003 contain such 
information as the state premiums and losses incurred. Combining this dataset with annual 
                                                 
9 Tort reform can increase accidents because Tortfeasor has less incentive to reduce risk.  
10 Tort reform can decrease accidents because lower prices could lead to the purchases of risk-reducing products.  
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statements of these companies, the authors were able get more information on the premiums earned 
and the contemporaneous losses incurred for each year. To avoid the possible bias effect of 
outliers, the authors excluded firms with less than one million dollars in insurance premiums. 
Although Born et al. (2009) analyzed the effects of malpractice reforms on insurer 
performance, they also examined their effects on loss ratios to test their profitability. In doing so, 
the authors began with an OLS regression. Based on prior research approach, they assumed that 
endogeneity was not a problem for tort reforms and either losses or premiums. They extended the 
model by including time fixed effects and firm fixed effects to capture significant effects that are 
specific to an organization. The authors estimated OLS, OLS with year fixed effects, OLS with 
year and firm fixed effects and quantile regressions. As did previous studies, they found that 
Noneconomic Damages Caps are associated with the reduced payments for medical malpractice 
and the increased profitability of insurers. They also found that Punitive Damages Caps are 
correlated with Insurance Losses. However, the coefficient for this reform was smaller. Born et al. 
(2009) additionally found, at their surprise, that Joint and Several Liability had a positive effect on 
the Losses. Although this is the case, they noted that this finding is “consistent with the mixed 
performance of this reform type in previous studies.”  
 Using quantile regressions, the authors analyzed the effects of the reforms on the different 
percentile of the loss distribution. They found that for Noneconomic Damages Caps, insurance 
companies that are above the 50th percentile in the loss distribution have coefficients that are 
negative, statistically significant and larger in magnitude. For Punitive Damages Caps, this 
significance is above the 25th percentile. However, Joint and Several Liability along with Collateral 
Source Rule have ambiguous results. The results suggested that tort reforms had the largest impacts 
on insurance companies with the largest losses. 
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CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS 
4.1. Data 
The data were collected through the U.S Census Bureau and the American Community 
Survey (population, earnings of people with 4 year degree), the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(Number of Lawyers, Earnings of Lawyers), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Violent Crime, 
Property Crime), the Center for Disease Control (Divorce Rate), U.S States Courts ( number of 
Bankruptcy Filings), FRED Saint Louis Fed (Real GDP, consumer price index), National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners ( Amount of Insurance Losses) and the Tort Reform 
database developed by Avraham of the University of Texas (Tort Reform activities).The model 
will examine a panel data of 50 U.S states plus the District of Columbia between 1998 and 2012. 
For best results, I deflated Number of Lawyers, Violent Crime, Property Crime, Number 
of Firms, and Number of Bankruptcy Filings by the state population. I also transformed Earnings 
and Alternative Earnings data into real terms by using the Consumer Price Index (1982 base year). 
In addition, I deflated Amount of Insurance Losses and GDP by both the CPI and state population. 
Finally, except for tort reform laws that are represented by dummy11 variables, all the variables 
were log linearized.  
4.2. Non-Tort Variables 
 Real GDP Per Capita 
This represents the per person total value of all final goods and services produced within 
the state during a specific year. This is a good measure of the level of economic activity occurring 
in a state. These economic activities include many transactions between individuals, businesses 
and governments that require the services of legal professionals. Lawyers can draft contracts, draft 
                                                 
11 Dummy variables: Value is 1 if law is enacted in the state and 0 otherwise.   
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patent applications, and represent entities in the buying, selling and reorganization of companies. 
A higher real GDP per capita may have a positive effect on the demand for lawyers. However, it 
may also have a negative effect on the supply of lawyers because a higher GDP is a good indication 
of good prospects for all professions in the nation. 
Per Pashigian (1977), Real Gross National Product (GNP), the total value of all final goods 
and services produced by “domestically owned factors”12 of production during a given year, is the 
most significant determinant of the demand for lawyers. Pashigian (1978) also indicated that 
National Income (NI), the sum of the values of all final goods and services produced domestically 
and the values of all final goods produced by domestically owned factors of production abroad, is 
directly related to the quantity demanded of lawyers. For this study, I use the Real GDP per Capita 
as it is the per person value of all final goods and services “produced domestically”13 during a 
given year. Although NI, GNP, and GDP all measure the values of the final product of a nation, I 
use Real GDP per Capita because it is the more commonly used measure of the standard of living 
of a nation and therefore its economic strength.  
Another reason for this choice is that this is a state-level study as we cannot calculate GNP 
or NI for states in the U.S where there are “residents of states but not citizens of states.”14 
Therefore, I assume that Real GDP per Capita may be directly related to the quantity demanded of 
lawyers. Real GDP per Capita is the per person sum of private consumption (C) spending, business 
investment spending (I), government spending (G) and net exports (NX):  Y = C + I + G + NX. 
                                                 
12 Land, labor, and capital owned by Americans regardless of their place of residence.  
13 Regardless of the citizenship of the owner of the factor: This includes a U.S citizen working at Ford Motor 
Company as well as the German doctor working at the University of Michigan Hospital.   
14 States in the U.S have residents. But there only citizens of the U.S.   
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The components of GDP involve transactions that vary in type, complexity and size. Small 
business transactions and individual transactions may be small but they require, in many cases, the 
understanding of local, state, and federal laws. 
John Flood (2007) noted that, in the search of low-cost labor and cheap raw materials, 
businesses have multiplied their international transactions. These transactions are very large and 
complex and sometimes with severe time constraints (Flood 2007). The author gave an example 
of such a transaction of 9 billion dollars that consisted of the exploitation of an offshore oil and 
gas reserves on the island of Sakhalin in Russia. These transactions involve multiple dimensions 
as experienced lawyers were needed to study, interpret and reconcile local laws with international 
laws. 
Drew Combs (2015), described that the increases in both GDP (2.4%) and Standard and 
Poor 500 stock index reflected opportunities for law firms, particularly the top 100 grossing law 
firms in the United States. He noted that the demand for lawyer services increased as the number 
of financial transactions increased in New York.  He also noted that in Texas, the oil industry 
opened opportunities for law firms as more energy transactions took place.  In Washington DC, 
the demand for regulatory work and government contracts allowed law firms to increase their 
revenues as well. Finally, Combs noted that in Silicon Valley, law firms increased their profits as 
venture capital funding made capital available for internet and mobile apps companies. 
Any increase in these components of real GDP can lead to, a shift of the demand curve 
from D0 to D1 which leads to the increase in the Number of Lawyers demanded at every price level. 
However, its impact on the supply will start to be realized three years later. Therefore, a rise in 
GDP will only immediately shift the demand curve while the shift in supply gradually happens 
three years later. 
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 Earnings of Bachelor Degree Holders at time t-3 
This is the earnings of people who hold a 4-year degree. Both Pashigian (1977) and 
Freeman (1975) noted that people choose to go to law school based on many variables including 
the discounted value of the earnings of lawyers as well as the discounted value of the earnings of 
alternative professions which do not require education beyond a 4-year degree. One can assume 
that the higher these earnings, the fewer people will go to law school. This variable directly affects 
the supply of lawyers and eventually both the equilibrium Number of Lawyers and the Earnings 
of Lawyers (http://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2000/Winter/art03.pdf). 
 Alternative Earnings 
This is the average earnings for “Alternative Professions”15 to the legal profession. I used 
the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to average 
the earnings of all occupations except those of attorneys. I use this variable for two reasons. The 
first reason is because the Earnings of Bachelor Degree’s Holders data provided by the U.S Census 
Bureau is limited to only few years. The second reason is that these Earnings are very close to 
those of the Bachelor’s Degree’s Holders. The mean log value of the Earnings of the Bachelor 
Degree’s Holders is 3.03 while that of the “Alternative Earnings” is 2.89. Their respective 
maximum values, minimum values, and standard deviations are also very close (see summary 
Statistics). Additionally, a similar variable used by Freeman (1975) used Earnings of “Alternative 
Occupation” as an independent variable in the modeling of the supply of lawyers. This is a group 
made of salaried professionals.  Moreover, these earnings are more comprehensive as they reflect 
a good number of potential professions that people may choose instead of becoming a lawyer. 
                                                 
15 Alternative career: All salaried professions other than “attorney.”  
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 Crime Rates 
Violent Crime describes the number of violent crimes per 100,000 people in the state per 
year and includes crimes committed with force such as murder and rape. Property Crime describes 
the number of crimes committed without the use of force in the state per year; it includes burglary, 
theft and auto-theft, larceny and arson. Not all crimes are prosecuted. However, in case of a 
prosecution, involved parties may benefit from professional legal representations. This is true even 
for those who do not have the means to pay for these services. In fact, public defense is a common 
part of the US justice system. For instance, based on the US Census Bureau data, the State of 
Alabama indigent defense budget was approximately 60 million dollars in 2012 
(https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/idsus0812.pdf). Therefore, an increase in crime may have 
an increasing effect on the demand for criminal lawyers’ services.  
Per Huang (2004) high crime, low level of education, long spells of unemployment and 
poverty are correlated. Hsieh et al. (1993) also noted that poverty and inequality are associated 
with violent crime. Therefore, high crime rates may mean that people are less wealthy and this 
may translate into less business for lawyers as a profession. This may reduce the supply of lawyers. 
Per Lawedu.org, an organization that encourages people to choose the field of law, criminal 
lawyers earn the least compared to the rest of the profession. Although criminal lawyers handle 
many cases at the same time, their income ranges between 45,000 and 130,000 dollars with an 
average of 78,000 dollars (http://www.lawyeredu.org/criminal-defense.html).  This also may 
reduce the supply of criminal lawyers in the long run. An increase in the Crime Rate may lead to 
an immediate upward shift in the demand curve and a slight leftward shift in the supply curve 
Therefore, Crime Rate may be positively correlated with the earnings of Lawyers although its 
impact on the Number of Lawyers may be ambiguous. 
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 Divorce Rate 
This variable is collected from the Center for Disease Control and is defined as the number 
of divorces per 1000 people per year in the state. Per the Federal Bureau of Investigation Statistics, 
between the periods of 1980 and 2015, divorce rates had been steadily declining with slight 
changes in the tendency. This study considers Divorce Rate as an independent variable for two 
reasons. Firstly, a study done by Pashigian (1977) found it to be a statistically significant although 
it is a positive determinant of the demand for lawyers. Secondly, Divorce Rate can be a good 
indicator of contentious relationships that may lead to higher demand for lawyers, especially if the 
case involves property, debts and children. 
Per Stanton (1959), divorce lawyers take into account the ability for the client to pay the 
fees that are involved in difficult cases. As he explained the difference between the specialist and 
the generalist, Stanton estimated that divorce lawyers earn higher fees in reconciliation cases than 
they do in actual divorce cases. The author asserted that the reason is because they spend more 
time in divorce cases. Although that may be corrected today by “hourly fees,” protracted litigation 
may be very expensive for clients. 
Yegge (1994) also reported that although the income of Americans increased in the 1980’s, 
many people were unable to afford legal services. He noted that many suggested that only a small 
portion of the 1. 175 million people who divorced in 1990 used representation.  Although free 
legal representation was available to income-based qualified people, many moderate-income 
people used self-representation. He asserted that these people were likely to self-represent in future 
cases as well. The author added that among the people who self-represent, only 20% could afford 
to pay the fees while 30% could not afford to pay the fees.  Yegge noted that the decision to self-
represent depended on having no children, no real estate, limited property, income of less than 
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50,000, and less than 10 years of marriage. This phenomenon may lead to a reduction in demand 
for lawyers’ services. 
 Amount of Insurance Losses per Registered Vehicle  
This is the amount of insurance losses in the year per state reported by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners. Accidents frequently lead to litigation that determines 
the amount of damages for which victims will be compensated. The Amount of Insurance Losses 
can be a good indicator of the number of claims filed during a specific period. I assume that 
insurance companies’ profitability is negatively correlated to the number of claims filed and the 
amounts paid per claim. Per Browne and Puelz (1996), attorney involvement in claims increases 
the size of the claim. Therefore, Insurance Losses may have a positive effect on the Number of 
Lawyers demanded. 
4.3. Tort Reform Variables 
Among the different reforms enumerated by Ronen Avraham in his database, the ones most 
widely adopted are enumerated below. However, other reforms such as Split Recovery Reform, 
Patient Compensation Fund and Punitive Evidence Reform are worth noting because they either 
put restrictions on awards or made other changes in the law that adversely affect plaintiffs.  
 Caps on Non-Economic Damages 
These are damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium or 
companionship, and other intangible injuries (http://atra.org/issues/noneconomic-
damagesreform). They are generally hard to value. Therefore, the awards are determined with little 
guidance established by law. Consequently, these awards can be erratic and are therefore very 
attractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers. Caps on Noneconomic Damages have therefore been a subject of 
contentious disputes between legislators, lawyers, insurance companies and medical practitioners. 
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For example, the American Tort Reform Association contends the cap should be at 250,000 dollars 
because otherwise it leads to greater inefficiencies and inequities in the tort system (American Tort 
Reform Association. 2016 http://www.atra.org/node/54 ). The plaintiffs’ lawyers argue the awards 
should be set on a case by case basis by the jury per the merits and the extent of the pain and 
suffering which is intangible. As of 2016, 30 states had enacted a Cap on Noneconomic Damages 
with awards varying between 250,000 and 1.5 million dollars (http://www.atra.org/node/54).  
 Caps on Punitive Damages 
Punitive Damages are awarded to punish the defendant for intentional or malicious 
misconduct. These damages are not awarded frequently. However, when they are, the sizes tend 
to be large and trending in that direction (http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damages-reform). 
The American Tort Reform Association contends that there should be an establishment of a clear 
evidence that there was malice and intent involved and that the damages should be proportional to 
the offenses (http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damages-reform). The plaintiffs’ lawyers argue 
that this should be done on a case by case basis and that the jury should be able to punish the 
defendants to discourage such behaviors in the future. By the year 2014, 36 states had passed laws 
putting caps on punitive damages. Most of these states now require that the plaintiffs prove with 
“clear and convincing evidence” that there was malice, intent, fraudulent, or grossly negligent 
action by the defendant. In some cases, a portion of the damages are paid by state funds. 
 Collateral Source Reform 
Per the Collateral Source Rule of the common law, any evidence showing that the plaintiff 
has been or will be compensated for damages by a source other than the defendant, was 
inadmissible. This mainly applied to payments to the plaintiff from their own insurance coverage. 
Proponents of this reform argued that the Collateral Source rule permitted some plaintiffs to get 
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more than the compensatory damages. Abrogation of the collateral Source Rule lead to the 
reduction of the awards by the amount already recovered through other means such as their 
insurance claims. At this point, about 26 states have adopted this reform. 
 Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule 
Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule sets a higher evidentiary threshold for the plaintiff. The 
language of this requirement differs from state to state. For instance, in the state of Arizona, 
Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule requires a plaintiff to show with clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant acted with an “evil” mind. However, in Kansas this law requires that the plaintiff 
shows that the defendant acted with wanton (deliberate, malicious) disregard for the plaintiff’s 
rights (Avraham 2014). Since this law requires more clear and convincing evidence from the 
plaintiffs, it may certainly decrease the demand for lawyers. However, from the point of view of 
the law firms, there might be an increase in the number of lawyers in order to increase the chances 
of winning. Law firms may appoint quality lawyers to these cases, but they may also increase the 
time allocated to these cases. 
 Joint and Several Liability Reform 
The common-law rule of Joint and Several Liability allows the plaintiff to collect damage 
awards from any of multiple defendants who are found liable. The plaintiff may collect any 
percentage of the awards from individual defendants so long as the total amount collected does not 
exceed 100 percent. Reform statutes limit the collection damages per the percentage of the 
defendant culpability. For instance, if a jury establishes that two defendants are jointly liable for a 
tort case, under Joint and Several Liability, the plaintiff can sue either or both defendants for the 
full damages. However, under the proportionate liability, the plaintiff can only sue each defendant 
based on their liability in the case. If the jury establishes defendant’s liability at 10%, the defendant 
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can only be responsible for 10% of the awarded damages. Therefore, reform may reduce the 
amount that may be collected overall by the plaintiff. As of 2016, 41 states have adopted this 
reform. However, some states have done so with exceptions and with stipulations on the 
percentages of responsibility for the offense. 
 Contingency Fee Rule 
Contingency Fee is the percentage-base fee that lawyers get once a case is resolved by 
verdict or settlement. This is often one third of the total amount awarded to the plaintiffs. For 
bearing the risks and expenses of the lawsuits, plaintiff’s lawyers receive a large percentage of the 
total awards. Some commentators suggest that this is unfair in that it permits lawyers not only to 
receive unreasonably high awards, but to seek cases that can easily be settled.  
 Split Recovery Rule 
Split Recovery are statutes that allow States to collect a portion of the amounts awarded to 
the plaintiffs (White 2002). These funds are run as a judicially administered fund and states collect 
them in two different ways. Some states collect them as a percentage of the total damages awarded. 
Other states allow the judge to determine the amount to be collected by the states.  Although the 
first mode of collection is most popular, the percentages vary from state to state. For instance, the 
State of Iowa collects 75% of the awards after attorney fees are deducted while the State of Utah 
collects 50% in excess of 20,000 dollars awarded after attorney fees. This suggests that plaintiffs’ 
awards can be seriously reduced by the enactment of this law especially after collection of attorney 
fees and other costs. 
 Tort Reform and the Market for Lawyers  
In this study, I assume that tort reform leads to a downward shift in the demand curve along 
the short-run approximately “perfectly inelastic” supply curve. This shift, at least in the short run, 
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decreases the Earnings of Lawyers. The decrease in the Earnings of Lawyers, leads to a movement 
towards the long-run horizontal supply curve. It is important to note that the adjustment period 
will depend on how fast people realize whether the change in demand is permanent, and on the 
capacity of law schools. But it is also important to note that the decrease in the Number of Lawyers 
as a response to lower earnings may not take too long. This is because law firms can let employees 
go, or even close practice, if there is not enough business. Therefore, lower Earnings for Lawyers 
decreases the Number of Lawyers while wages rise. This process continues until the long run 
equilibrium, located on the long-run supply curve, is reached. Whether the change in demand is 
temporary, the new equilibrium will be located in the quadrant below and to the left of the old 
demand curve. This means that there may just be a decrease in the Earnings of Lawyers or 
situations in which both the Number of Lawyers and the Earnings of Lawyers decrease. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE MODEL 
Does Tort reform affect the market for lawyers? Since the demand for lawyers and their 
income depend both on the number of potential claims and the average awards from lawsuits, it is 
conceivable that any change in the tort laws will influence these two variables. Consider the 
following variables: 
Lit = Equilibrium number of lawyers per capita at time t, 
Li t-1 = Equilibrium number of lawyers per capita at time t -1, 
Ii t = Median Earnings of Lawyers at time t, 
Di t = Demand for Lawyers at time t, 
Si t = Supply of Lawyers at time t, 
Ti t = Tort Reform Activities at time t, 
Gi t = Real earnings of College Graduates (4-year degree) at time t-3, 
Zi t (Demand) = Exogenous variables, Ei t (Supply) = Exogenous variables, 
 x , y, p, and f are the error terms.  
Based on theory, the demand and supply functions are: 
Di t = D (Ii t , Tit , Zit ) and Sit = S (Ii t , Gi t , Ei t ), 
Di t = bi + b1 Ii t + b2 Ti t + b3 Zi t + xi t  (1), 
Sit = ci + c1 Ii t + c2 Gi t + c3 Li t-1 + c4 Ei t + yi t. (2). 
Equations (1) and (2) state that as income increases, the demand for Lawyers decreases. But Tort 
Reforms are negatively correlated with the Number of Lawyers in the long-run. Although the 
supply of lawyers is positively correlated with the Earnings of Lawyers, the demand is negatively 
correlated with these earnings.  However, the income of College Graduates has a decreasing effect 
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on the supply of lawyers.  The equilibrium condition requires that the demand for lawyers be equal 
to the supply of lawyers. Therefore, 
Dit = Si t ;   ci + c1 Ii t + c2 Gi t + c3 Lit-1 + c4 Ei t + yi t =  bi + b1 Ii t + b2 Ti t + b3 Zi t + xi t . 
Thus, the equilibrium Earnings is the following: 
Iit =   { (ci – bi )+ c3 Li t-1 + c2 Gi t  - b3 Zi t + c4 Ei t  - b2 Ti t }/ (b1 – c1) (3) 
Ii t = di + d1 Li t -1 + d2 Gi t  + d3 Zi t + d4 E i t + d5 Ti t + fi t  ( reduced form) (3),  
where 
di = (ci – bi)/(b1 – c1) 
d1 = c3/(b1 – c1) 
d2 = c2/(b1 – c1) 
d3 = - b3/(b1 – c1) 
d4 = c4/(b1 – c1) 
d5 = - b2/(b1 – c1) 
ft = (yi t – xi t)/(b1 – c1). 
Plugging equation (3) into equation (1), we get the following equation:  
Li t = gi + g1 Li t-1 + g2 Gi t + g3 Zi t + g4 Ei t + g5 Ti t + pi t (4), 
where 
gi = (b1ci – bi ci)/(b1 – c1) 
g1 = b1 c3/(b1 – c1) 
g2 = b1 c2/(b1 – c1) 
g3 = - b3 c1/(b1 – c1) 
g4 = b1 c4/(b1 – c1) 
g5 = - b2 c1 /(b1 – c1) 
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pt = (b1 yi t – c1 xi t)/(b1 – c1). 
This study will consist of estimating equations (3) and (4). The Number of Lawyers per 
100,000 people is a function of the number of lawyers per 100,000 people at time t-1 (Li t-1), the 
real Earnings of 4-year College Graduates at time t-3 (Gi t-3), the exogenous variables Zi t (the Real 
GDP per Capita, the Number of New Firms incorporated per 100,000 people, the Number Violent 
Crimes per 100,000 people, the number of Property Crime per 100,000 people, the number of 
Bankruptcy Filings per 100,000 people, the Amount of Insurance Losses per Registered Vehicle) 
and the tort laws Ti t (0 = no reform, 1= year after reform). 
5.1. Model Specification 
Although this paper focuses on the impacts of tort reform on the market for lawyers, the 
two models used also evaluate the impact of non-tort determinants on this market. Model A is an 
extension of the model used by Pashigian. This model adds tort variables as proxies for the legal 
activities within states. I further extend the research by testing the impact of tort reforms on the 
Earnings of Lawyers in Model B. These two points will be the specific contributions of the paper. 
In estimating the equation of the Number of Lawyers, I used some standard tests for good 
model specification. The xtserial test for equation (4) resulted in a presence of autocorrelation in 
the panel data {F (1, 50) = 28.385 with prob > F = 0.000}. The xtserial test also resulted in a 
presence of a serial correlation in equation (3) {F (1, 44) = 71.348 with prob> F= 0.0000}. 
Although autocorrelation is present in the data for both models (3) and (4) the standard Pesaran 
test shows no contemporaneous correlation in the data. For the model (3) however, the Testparm 
test revealed a presence of time fixed effect in the model with the following F statistics and 
probability: F (1, 528)=1.74 ; Prob > F = 0.0615. The xttest3 tests also revealed the presence of 
heteroscedasticity for both equations (3) and (4) with Prob> chi2 = 0.000. 
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I assumed, based on previous research of tort reforms (Born et al. 2009) that there is no 
endogeneity issues between the Number of Lawyers and tort reform. Although tort reform may 
have an impact on the Number of Lawyers, I have seen no evidence that the Number of Lawyers 
affect tort reform. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE NUMBER OF LAWYERS 
6.1. Estimation 
Table 4: Number of Lawyers per 100,000 People. 
 (Elasticities)* p<0.05 ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
 OLS FGLS2 FGLS3 FGLS4 FGLS5 
Non-Tort Variables      
Number of Lawyers t-1 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.978*** 0.981*** 0.981*** 
L3 AlternativeEarnings - 0.132* - 0.132* -0.149*** - 
0.157*** 
-0.151*** 
Real GDP per Cap 0.0833** 0.0833** 0.0809*** 0.0769** 0.0771*** 
Violent Crime - 0.00810 - 0.00810 -0.00742 - 0.00729 -0.0116 
Property Crime 0.0147 0.0147 -0.00257 - 0.00398 -0.00025 
Divorce - 0.0371 - 0.0371 -0.0261 - 0.0263 -0.0282* 
Number of Firms 0.0149 0.0149 0.0209 0.0201 0.0135 
Insurance Losses 0.0313* 0.0313* 0.0347*** 0.0348** 0.0344*** 
Bankruptcy Filings 0.0231* 0.0231* 0.0362*** 0.0363*** 0.0360*** 
Tort-variables   
Noneconomic 0.3576 0.3576 1.816 0.1581 0.238 
PunitiveDamages - 0.8637 - 0.8637 - 0.944 - 0.8758 0.863 
TotalDamages 0.8052 0.8052 - 0.151 - 0.1071 0.137 
SplitRecovery - 1.1465 - 1.1465 - 0.812 - 0.7760 0.57 
CollateralSource - 0.0459 - 0.0459 - 0.014 - 0.0344 0.253 
PunitiveEvidence 0.5475 0.5475 0.036 0.0233 0.126 
PeriodicPayment 0.3015 0.3015 0.462 0.4952 0.405 
ContingencyFee 0.3687 0.3687 - 0.561 - 0.5465 0.411 
JointSeveralLiability - 0.6541 - 0.6541 - 0.755 - 0.7458 0.785 
PatientCompensationFund - 0.3877 - 0.3877 0.367 0.2874 0.576 
ComparativeFault 0.0300 0.0300 - 0.066 - 0.0428 0.078 
Year Effect     0.004 
State Effect     0.0289 
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Table 4 presents the results of the estimations using the Generalized Least Squared method. 
I start with the basic regression of the Number of Lawyers on all the independent variables. This 
basic OLS model estimated 20 coefficients for a total of 500 observations and an F (20,479)=1347 
Prob> F=0.000. The corresponding R squared, the explanatory power of the model, is 
approximately the same as the adjusted R squared of 98%. However, the Root MSE was 78.25%. 
The results indicate that the Lagged Number of Lawyers, the Lagged Earnings of Alternative 
Professions, the Real GDP per Capita, the Divorce Rate, the Amount of Insurance Losses, and the 
Number of Bankruptcy filed were the only significant determinants of the Number of Lawyers. 
All tort reform variables appear insignificant in the OLS model. 
Since previous tests indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the 
data, I estimated the model by using the Generalized Least squared method.  The results of the 
plain Generalized Least Squared method are presented in Column 2 (FGLS2). For 500 
observations and 49 groups, the Wald Chi 2 (20) = 28140.58 with Prob > chi2 =0.00. The results 
of this estimation are identical (significance level and coefficients) to the OLS’ results although 
most of the standard errors are slightly smaller.  After controlling for heteroscedasticity alone, the 
results presented in Column 3 (FGLS 3), show a Wald Chi 2(20) = 81853.60 with a Prob > Chi 2= 
0.000. The significant variables are the Lagged Number of Lawyers, the Lagged Earnings of 
Alternative Professions, the Real GDP per Capita, the Amount of Insurance Losses, and the 
Number of Bankruptcy filed in the Federal District Courts. The coefficients are larger in all cases 
with much smaller standard errors. For instance, the elasticity for the Lagged Number of Lawyers 
improved from 0.965 to 0.978 at the 1%significance level. But the standard error decreased from 
0.012 to 0.0098.   
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To improve on the outcome of this model, I controlled for the existing autocorrelation 
between the error terms. The results of this estimation that control for both heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation are presented in Column 4 (FGLS4). The estimates show the same five variables 
to be significant all at the 1% level with smaller standard errors. The coefficients, in absolute value, 
slightly increased for the Lagged Number of Lawyers the Lagged Earnings of Alternative 
Professions, the Insurance Losses, and the Number of Bankruptcy filed although it slightly 
decreased for the Real GDP per Capita. The resulting Wald Chi 2 (20) =101496.18 is larger than 
in the previous three estimations while the standard errors are slightly smaller. 
I further improved the model by including year and state fixed effect terms to control for 
any variations that are inherent to specific year or to particular states. The results of this estimation 
are presented in column 5 (FGLS5). Although these estimates have approximately the same 
standard errors as in column 4, the variables that are significant are identical to those in the 
previous estimation except that one more variable is again significant. They are the Lagged 
Number of Lawyers, the Lagged Earnings of the Alternative Professions, the Real GDP per Capita, 
the Divorce rate, the Amount of Insurance Losses, and the Number of Bankruptcy filed. All these 
variables have the same signs in all cases, but their coefficients are slightly lower in FGLS4 except 
for that of the Lagged Number of Lawyers which remained the same (0.981) while Real GDP per 
Capita slightly increased from 0.0769 to 0.0771. 
Although these five estimations show that non-tort variables have some impacts on the 
Number of Lawyers, they do not show any evidence that tort reform has an impact on the Number 
of Lawyers. All tort reform variables appear to have an insignificant impact on the Number of 
Lawyers. 
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The Generalized Least Squared method described above gave results for non-tort variables 
that agree with the theory described in Chapter 2. But the results are not conclusive for tort reform 
variables as there is no evidence that these reforms have any impact on the Number of Lawyers.  
However, because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable in the equation, I estimated the 
model using a new version of the Hildrith-Lu search method applied by Pashigian. The Panel 
Corrected Standard Error method uses the Prais-Winsten estimation to search for any 
autocorrelation parameter that minimizes the sum of squared errors. The PCSE method is also 
appropriate for it does not have any restriction on the number of variables while the FGLS restricts 
the number of independent variables to be smaller than the number of periods (N< T). 
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Table 5: Number of Lawyers per 100,000 People. 
 (Elasticities)* p<0.05 ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
 Prais 1 Prais 2 PCSE3 PCSE4 PCSE5 
Non-Tort Variables      
Number of Lawyers t-1 0.973*** 0.975*** 0.965*** 0.970*** 0.969*** 
L3 AlternativeEarnings - 0.145*** - 0.149*** -0.132** - 0.139** -0.140** 
Real GDP per Cap 0.0752*** 0.0735*** 0.0833*** 0.0787*** 0.0788*** 
Violent Crime - 0.008108 - 0.008120 -0.00810 - 0.00814 -0.0116 
Property Crime 0.0109 0.00993 0.0147 0.0126 0.0184 
Divorce - 0.0355* - 0.0352* -0.0371* - 0.0362* -0.0376* 
Number of Firms 0.0149 0.0109 0.0149 0.0131 0.0151 
Insurance Losses 0.0116 0.0300** 0.0313** 0.0306** 0.0310** 
Bankruptcy Filings 0.0302** 0.0234*** 0.0231** 0.0232** 0.0250*** 
Tort-variables   
Noneconomic 0.298 0.283 0.864 0.327 0.45 
PunitiveDamages -0.717 -0.682 -0.81 -0.785 -0.851 
TotalDamages 0.799 0.795 1.147 0.804 0.698 
SplitRecovery -1.136 -1.126 -0.046 -1.136 -0.995 
CollateralSource -0.029 -0.025 -0.55 -0.037 -0.149 
PunitiveEvidence 0.501 0.49 0.301 0.522 0.241 
PeriodicPayment 0.367 0.383 0.369 0.337 0.256 
ContingencyFee 0.369 0.371 0.654 0.369 0.392 
JointSeveralLiability -0.656 -0.656 -0.388 -0.655 0.726 
PatientCompensationFund -0.494 -0.522 -0.03 -0.443 0.157 
ComparativeFault 0.084 0.096 0.03 0.006 0.141 
Year Effect     0.065 
State Effect     0.029 
 
Similar to the FGLS processes, I started with the Prais-Winsten estimation of the Number 
of Lawyers with respect to the independent Variables. The calculation is based on six iterations 
for a rho value of - 0.13, F (20,479) = 1956.59, R squared and adjusted R squared of 98.7%. The 
results in column 1 (Prais 1) show that the Lagged Number of Lawyers, the Lagged Earnings of 
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Alternative Professions, the Real GDP per Capita, the Divorce rate, the Insurance Losses as well 
as the Number of Bankruptcy filed are significant determinants of the Number of Lawyers. They 
also agree with the theory as described in chapter 2. But the tort reform variables are all 
insignificant. Using the SSE search option with Prais-Winsten, the results were the same as far as 
variables that are significant determinants of the Number of Lawyers although this method 
computed 14 different iterations (rho = - 0.17) and R squared of 98.85  in minimizing the sum of 
the squared errors. These results are in column 2 (Prais 2). 
I also estimated the model using PCSE corrected for heteroscedasticity. The results in 
column 3 (PCSE3) show similar results as those in the previous columns. However, the 
coefficients are slightly different although the standard errors slightly decreased with a Wald Chi2 
(20) = 62954.16 and R squared of 98.25%.  I continued by estimating the model with a PCSE that 
controlled for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The results in Column 4 (PCSE4) show 
slight changes in the coefficients although the standard errors decreased while the significance of 
all the variables remain the same. This slightly improved the explanatory power R squared from 
98.25 to 98.52% with a Wald Chi 2 (20) = 76593.44.  I finally improved the PCSE model by 
including the control variables for year and state effects. Although the results in column 5 (PCSE5) 
show the same signs and levels of significance for the same variables as in the previous column, 
the coefficients slightly changed. The explanatory power improved to 98.54% with a Wald Chi 2 
(20) = 77854.34 and rho of -0.07.  
Both the FGLS (Table 4) and the PCSE (Table 5) are consistent estimators although the 
FGLS coefficients are more efficient (http://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtxtpcse.pdf). However, 
in this study, the PCSE results are chosen because the PCSE appropriately deals with the Lagged 
value of the dependent variable while controlling for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. It also 
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passes the test of feasibility for the FGLS requires the number of periods to be greater than the 
number of independent variables. Considering all the characteristics of this dataset, I will report 
the results in column 5 of Table 5 as the outcome of this study. This is the one based on the PCSE 
that controlled both for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. This means that the results are 
going to be both unbiased and efficient. In this column, I also isolate the effects that may be specific 
to a particular state or to a particular year. This provides a better understanding of the impacts of 
each determinant on the Number of Lawyers.   
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6.2. Estimation Results 
6.2.1. Non-tort Reform Variables 
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the Number of Lawyers is strongly determined by the 
Lagged Number of Lawyers at the 1% significance level, the Lagged Earnings of Alternative 
Professions at the 5% significance level, the Real GDP per Capita at the 1% significance level, the 
Divorce Rate at the 10% significance level, and Insurance Losses at the 5% significance level, and 
the Number of Bankruptcy Filed at the 1% significance level. But there is no evidence that Violent 
Crime, Property Crime, or the Number of Firms have any impacts on the Number of Lawyers. 
 Lagged Number of Lawyers (t - 1) 
The estimates in column 1 of Table 5 indicate that a 1% increase in the Lagged Number of 
Lawyers leads to approximately a 0.967% increase in the Number of Lawyers. This finding is in 
accordance with Pashigian (1977) and Pashigian (1978) as it explains the very low speed of 
adjustment towards the long run equilibrium of the Number of Lawyers. This low speed of 
adjustment referred to the fact that the change in the Number of Lawyers does not only depend on 
the change in demand, but also on the capacity of the law schools to graduate students. To be a 
lawyer, one must complete law school and eventually pass the bar. Therefore, law schools cannot 
immediately fulfill a rise in demand for lawyers because it takes at least three years to go through 
the process of becoming a lawyer. An increase in supply of lawyers, for instance, may take an 
adjustment period of more than two decades (Pashigian 1978). 
 Lagged Alternative Earnings (t -3) 
The Lagged Earnings of Alternative Professions, a supply-side variable, has a negative sign 
as shown in column 1 of Table 6. This indicates that an increase in the Lagged Earnings of 
Alternative Professions leads to a decrease in supply of lawyers as more potential workers choose 
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alternative careers instead of going through the three years of law school and the mandatory bar 
exam. If a construction management profession, for instance offers a relatively higher wage rate, 
this attracts more people including those who would consider attending law school. The elasticity 
table (Table 6 –Column 1) of the Number of Lawyers with respect to the Earnings of Alternative 
Professions shows that, given Real GDP per Capita, a 1% increase in the Earnings of Alternative 
Professions decreases the Number of Lawyers by 0.14%. These results also agree with the findings 
of both Pahigian (1977) and Freeman (1975). 
 Real GDP per Capita 
The results (Table 6 column 1) of the estimation that used the PCSE method conclude 
findings that are different than those of Pashigian (1977). Pashigian used both the Gross National 
Product and the Gross National Product per Capita in his model. He found the Gross National 
Product per Capita is negatively correlated with the Number of Lawyers when the Gross National 
Product is included. However, the model in this paper normalized most of the variables by the 
population. Therefore, it is evaluating the Number of Lawyers per 100,000 people as opposed to 
the nominal Number of Lawyers as done by Pashigian (1977). Pashigian also probably assumed 
that the change in supply may be immediate although I assume that prosperity leads to increase 
opportunities for all sectors of the economy including the law profession. 
Column 1 of Table 6 shows that the Number of Lawyers is positively correlated with GDP 
per Capita and that a 1% increase in GDP per Capita leads to 0.08% increase in the Number of 
Lawyers. Although it is significant at the 5% level, this coefficient is small. 
GDP may be used as a good measure of the volume of economic activity in the nation. A 
rise in GDP may be a sign of increase opportunities in most sectors of the society including the 
law profession. This leads to an increase in the demand for lawyers’ services and a potential future 
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decrease in the supply of lawyers. The increase in demand is represented by an upward shift in the 
demand curve. Although the Number of Lawyers is, in approximation, “perfectly inelastic” in the 
short-run, this change in demand may be partially fulfilled by the existing pool of lawyers who 
may take on few more cases. It can also be partially fulfilled by the entry into the market of those 
lawyers who have law degrees but are not practicing at the time as mentioned by Pashigian. 
However, the decrease in supply will not be immediate as this will be reflected in the enrollments 
in law school first and may take at least three years before it starts to slowly materialize. The speed 
of this process certainly depends on the law schools’ capacity to graduate “new lawyers” 
(Pashigian 1978). 
Additionally, since practicing lawyers earn more on average than people in alternative 
professions (Summary Table Appendix B), the existing pool of lawyers is not likely to decrease 
during economic expansion. Therefore, in the short run, the Number of Lawyers will modestly 
increase while relatively more people opt for alternative professions as they enter college. This 
increase is rather negligible because the increase in demand is very low. 
 Divorce Rate 
The estimation results in column 1 of Table 6 show that Divorce Rate is negatively 
correlated with the Number of Lawyers at the 5% significance level. A 1% increase in Divorce 
Rate leads to a negligible (0.04%) decrease in the Number of Lawyers. Although Pashigian found 
a positive and negligible correlation for Divorce, the results I found in this research are supported 
by theory (chapter 2) as well as Stanton (1959) and Yegge (1994) findings. 
 Amount of Insurance Losses per Registered Vehicle 
The elasticity table (Table 6 column 1) shows that the Amount of Insurance Losses per 
Registered Vehicle is positively correlated with the Number of Lawyers at the 10% significance 
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level. However, the elasticity of Insurance Losses with respect to the Number of Lawyers is very 
small, showing that a 1% increase in the Amount of Insurance Losses per Registered Vehicle is 
correlated with an approximately 0.03% increase in the Number of Lawyers. These results support 
the findings of Browne and Puelz (1996), that attorney involvement in claims increases the size of 
the claims. This may lead to a slight increase in the demand for lawyers; however, the impact of 
this variable is negligible. 
 Bankruptcy Filings 
Like the Insurance Losses per Registered Vehicle, the Number of Bankruptcy Filings at 
the Federal District Court is positively correlated with the Number of Lawyers at the 5% 
significance level with a very small elasticity as well (Table 6 column 1). A 1% increase in the 
Number of Bankruptcy filings leads to a 0.025% increase in the Number of Lawyers. Although 
statistically significant, this elasticity is also negligible because it barely shifts the demand curve 
upward. 
6.2.2. Tort Reform Variables  
Based on the PCSE model, column 5 of Table 5shows that no tort reform variables is 
significantly correlated with the Number of Lawyers. This is also true for the estimations done 
under the FGLS method (Column 5 Table 4). This model’s findings in column 1 of Table 5 also 
show that there is no evidence of specific state or year effect on the Number of Lawyers. 
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6.2.3 Other Estimations 
Table 6: Other Estimations The Number of Lawyers (PCSE) 
 PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE FGLS FGLS 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Non-Tort Variables       
Number of Lawyers t-1 0.969*** 0.920*** 0.985*** 0.972*** 0.42*** 0.984*** 
L3 AlternativeEarnings -0.140**  -0.0769 -0.130**  -0.144*** 
Real GDP per Cap 0.079*** 0.120***  0.0734*** 0.103*** 0.0713*** 
Violent Crime -0.0116 -0.0188 -0.0005  -0.180  
Property Crime 0.0184 0.0303 0.0146 0.00179 0.0106 -0.0166 
Divorce -0.0376* -0.0237 -0.0395** -0.0313* -0.00611 -0.0203 
Number of Firms 0.0151 0.0300 0.0351  0.0266  
Insurance Losses 0.0310** 0.0327** 0.0234* 0.0233* 0.0252** 0.026*** 
Bankruptcy Filings 0.025*** 0.0168 0.0186 0.0221** 0.025*** 0.0334*** 
Tort-variables    
Noneconomic 0.45 1.82 0.019 0.26 1.31 0.077 
PunitiveDamages -0.85 -1.98** -0.886 -0.86 -1.81 -0.95 
TotalDamages 0.698 1.99 1.20 0.94 0.85 0.47 
SplitRecovery -0.99 1.73 -0.98 -1.03 1.44 -0.55 
CollateralSource -0.149 -0.75 -0.31 -0.039 -0.28 -0.19 
PunitiveEvidence 0.241 1.22 0.52 0.33 0.88 0.1 
PeriodicPayment 0.256 -0.75 0.14 0.26 -0.6 0.38 
ContingencyFee 0.392 1.70 0.72 0.31 0.67 -0.32 
JointSeveralLiability -0.73 - 0.89 -0.63 -0.61 -0.76 -0.66 
PatientCompensationFund -0.157 0.3 -0.24 -0.34 1.35 0.35 
ComparativeFault 0.141 -0.58 0.14 0.21 0.53 0.12 
Year Effect 0.065 -0.23 0.099 0.022 -0.09 -0.36 
State Effect -0.029 -0.015 -0.03 -0.022 -0.03 -0.03 
 
Although, these results are not in line with expectations, I estimated the model by using 
four other combinations of the given independent variables. The results are presented in columns 
1 through 4 in Table 6.  Column 2 of Table 6 presents the estimates of the model without the 
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Lagged Earnings of Alternative Professions. These estimates show that the Lagged Number of 
Lawyers, the Real GDP per Capita, and the Insurance Losses are the only non-tort variables that 
are significant.  The Real GDP per Capita as well as the Insurance Losses increased in elasticity 
while the Lagged Number of Lawyers decreased. This increase in the Real GDP per Capita is 
significant enough to support 0.68 correlation between the two variables ( Correlation Matrix 
Appendix B). In fact the Earnings of Alternative Professions may highly depend on the Gross 
Domestic Product.  
However, two out of the eleven tort variables are significant under these conditions. Caps 
on Noneconomic Damages is positively correlated with the Number of Lawyers the 10% level 
although the Punitive Damages Caps shows a negative sign at the 5% significance level. But the 
standard errors increased tremendously compared to the baseline model.  This shows that Lagged 
Earnings of Professions is a very important determinant of the Number of Lawyers. 
Column 3 of Table 6 shows the estimates of the model without Real GDP per Capita 
although column 4 shows its estimates without Violent Crime and the Number of Firms. Although 
both of these improve the results as the standard errors decreased, the estimates are not as efficient 
as the ones in Column 1 of Table 6.  The estimates without real GDP per Capita show that the 
Lagged Number of Lawyers is significant at the 1% level although the Lagged Earnings of 
Alternative Professions is not significant. But the Divorce Rate, the Insurance Losses and the 
Number of Bankruptcy filed are all significant. The estimates in Column 4 of Table 6 show 
approximately the same results as those in column 1 of Table 6.  
Using the same series of combinations of variables, the FGLS gave similar results except 
that Punitive Damages is the only tort reform that is significant when Real GDP per Capita is 
removed and when the Number of Firms and the Violent Crime are removed.  
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 Caps on Punitive Damages Rule 
In agreement with theory, the Caps on Punitive Damages results in a decrease in the 
Number of Lawyers by 0.95% under the FGLS method. This result is only significant at the 10% 
level and excludes two variables (Number of Firms and Violent Crime) out of the model. The Caps 
on Punitive Damages puts a cap on the awards of the plaintiffs. This decreases the potential 
revenue of law firms especially if they are paid on a contingency fee basis. Therefore, this reform 
may lead to a shift in the demand of lawyers downward along the approximately inelastic short-
run supply curve. Consequently, it may lead to a decrease in the Number of Lawyers. However, 
this decrease is very small with an elasticity of 0.95 and the results cannot be reliable because the 
FGLS restricts the number of periods to be greater than the number of independent variables.  
6.3. Lagged Effects of Tort Reform Variables 
I estimated the impacts of the lagged values of tort variables to see if these law changes 
had any effects on the Number of Lawyers through time. Since this method involves different 
lagged values of the variables, I used the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) analysis. Therefore, I ran 
multiple regressions of the Number of Lawyers on the independent variables. For the first series 
of estimations, I assumed no endogeneity between the variables. In the second set of regressions, 
I assumed that there is a possible endogeneity issue between tort variables and the Number of 
Lawyers. The results of these estimations show that only the lagged Number of Lawyers is a 
significant determinant in this market. A 1% increase in the lagged Number of Lawyers increased 
the Number of Lawyers by 1%.  This is significant at the 1% level.  The other non-tort variables, 
tort variables and their respective lagged 1 and lagged 2 values are either insignificant or 
significant with extremely small elasticities. But more research is needed to validate these results. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE EARNINGS OF LAWYERS 
7.1 Estimation 
Although the aim of this paper was to estimate the Number of Lawyers, I estimated the 
Earnings of Lawyers to see if the results are consistent with the both previous findings and those 
in this study. 
Table 7: Real Earnings of Lawyers.   
  (Elasticities)  * p<0.05 ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001  
  OLS  FE  FE (robust)  FE -Year  
Non-Tort Variables          
Number of Lawyers t-1  0.0428** - 0.00815  - 0.00815  -0.0138 
L3 AlternativeEarnings  0.330***  0.191**  0.191**  0.178*** 
Real GDP per Cap  0.198***  0.0488  0.0488  0.00299 
Violent Crime  - 0.00305  0.0507  0.0507  0.0488 
Property Crime  0.0702** 0.0398  0.0398  0.0567 
Divorce  - 0.141***  - 0.0421  - 0.0421  -0.0281 
Number of Firms  - 0.364***  -0.133  -0.133  -0.0301 
Insurance Losses  0.0669***  -0.00420  -0.00420  -0.00623 
Bankruptcy Filings  0.00731  -0.0242*  -0.0242  -0.0211 
 Tort-variables   
Noneconomic  - 3.306***  - 6.237** - 6.237 -0.0625 
PunitiveDamages  0.948  0.230  0.230  0.087 
TotalDamages  7.101***  0.000  0.000  0 
SplitRecovery  2.788*  -17.00***  -17.00***  -17.59*** 
CollateralSource  2.706**  7.412  7.412  7.35 
PunitiveEvidence  4.144***  - 10.054  - 10.054 * -10.18* 
PeriodicPayment  1.430*  0.777  0.777  0.815 
ContingencyFee  9.713***  14.912***  14.912**  13.5*** 
JointSeveralLiability  - 5.654***  - 3.066  - 3.066  -3.02 
PatientCompensationFund  - 2.051  - 5.243  - 5.243  -5.39 
ComparativeFault  - 0.066  0.000  0.000  0 
Year Effect    0.24 
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Table 7 presents the results of the estimations of the Earnings of Lawyers. I start with the 
basic OLS estimation shown in column 1 (OLS).  The estimation yielded an F (20, 480) = 59.64 
and an R squared and an adjusted R squared of approximately 71%. The results show that the 
Earnings of Lawyers is strongly and positively correlated with the Lagged Number of Lawyers, 
the Lagged Alternative Earnings, the Real GDP, Property Crime, and Insurance Losses. The 
significant tort variables include Total Damages, Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule, Collateral 
Source Rule, Periodic Payment Reform, and Contingency Fee Rule. The basic OLS results also 
show that Earnings of Lawyers is negatively correlated with the Divorce Rate, the Number of 
Firms, and the tort variables Noneconomic Damages, Joint Several Liability. 
Columns 2 through 4 of Table 7 present the results of the Fixed Effect (FE) models that 
correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Column 2 (FE) presents the estimations results 
for the basic Fixed Effect model although column 3 (FE robust) present the Fixed Effect model 
that controls for heteroscedasticity. These two estimations (FE and FE robust) show that Split 
Recovery is negatively correlated with the Earnings of Lawyers although Lagged Earnings of 
Alternative Profession and Contingency Fee Rule are positively correlated with the Earnings of 
Lawyers. However, the basic FE model also shows that Caps on Noneconomic Damages is 
negatively correlated with the Earnings of Lawyers.  I improved the model by including both the 
year fixed effect. The estimates of this alternative model are presented in column 4 (FE -Year). 
The explanatory power of the model increased from 0.83 for the FE to 0.85 for the FE that included 
the year effect. The estimates presented in this column show that Violent Crime and Contingency 
Fee Rule increase the Earnings of Lawyers. However, Noneconomic Damages, Split Recovery, 
Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule decreased the Earnings of Lawyers.  
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For its completeness in dealing with the issue of heteroscedasticity, and because of the 
inclusion of the year effect term that expand the understanding of the model, the estimates in 
column 4 (FE -Year) will be used in this paper.   
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7.2. Results 
7.2.1. Non-Tort Variables 
Column 4 (FE interact) of Table 7 shows that the Earnings of Lawyers is strongly correlated 
with the Lagged Earnings of Alternative Professions at the 1% significance level. However, there 
is no evidence that other non-tort variables have any impact on the Earnings of Lawyers.  
 Lagged Number of Lawyers per Capita 
There is no evidence that the Lagged Number of Lawyers is correlated with the Earnings 
of Lawyers. This result supports the findings in the previous chapter. The Number of Lawyers is 
positively and directly correlated with its lagged value at approximately 1 to 1. This is what 
explains the slow adjustment to any change in the market for Lawyers. Since an increase in the 
Lagged Number of Lawyers almost increases the Number of Lawyers by the same amount, this 
explains the slow response of this market to new shocks. Lawyers are generally enrolled for three 
years, and they have to generally pass a bar exam in order to practice. Consequently, the “newly 
admitted lawyers” represent a response to previous shocks in the market. This may not have any 
impact on the Earnings of Lawyers. 
 Real GDP per Capita 
There is no evidence that Real GDP per Capita is correlated with the Earnings of Lawyers. 
Although Real GDP per Capita increases the demand for Lawyers’ services as noted by Combs 
(2015), its impact on the Number of Lawyers is not large enough to change the equilibrium wage 
offered. This may be because the law profession has different specializations (divorce, business, 
criminal etc.). An increase in real GDP per Capita may lead to an increase in demand for Business 
Lawyers’ services while other (divorce, criminal, public policy) lawyers’ services may or may not 
decrease. This is understandable because the change in demand may be more from the business 
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transactions; however, it involves lawyers that are specialized in business law. Consequently, this 
increase in demand for lawyers’ services generated by a rise in GDP is not large enough to warrant 
an increase in Earnings of Lawyers. 
 Lagged Earnings of Alternative Professions 
The results in column 4 of Table 7 show that Earnings of Lawyers is positively correlated 
with the Lagged Earnings of Alternative Professions at the 1% significance level. They also show 
that a 1% increase in the Earnings of Alternative Professions is correlated with a 0.178 % increase 
in the Earnings of Lawyers. This finding agrees with theory in that an increase in the earnings of 
other professions make these professions relatively more attractive. Therefore, fewer people may 
enroll in law school. This will affect the supply of lawyers three years later. A shift in the supply 
of lawyers to the left will lead to a new equilibrium whereas the Earnings of Lawyers is higher.    
 Other variables 
The estimates show no evidence that Crime Rates, Divorce Rate, Insurance Losses, and the 
Number of Bankruptcy Filed, are significant determinants of the Earnings of Lawyers. Similarly 
to the Real GDP, these variables have negligible elasticities with respect to the number of Lawyers. 
Their elasticities are less than 0.05.  Therefore, the shifts in demand that result from their individual 
increases are not large enough to warrant a change in the Earnings of Lawyers. 
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7.2.2. Tort Variables 
The estimates in column 4 (FE -Year) of Table7 show that the Earnings of Lawyers is 
strongly correlated with the enactments of  Split Recovery Rule, Punitive Damages (Evidence) 
Rule and Contingency Fee Rule.  Except for the positive sign of the Contingency Fee Rule, the 
findings agree with theory.  
 Split Recovery 
The estimates in column 4 of Table 7 show that the enactment of Split Recovery has the 
highest impact on Earnings of Lawyers with an elasticity of 17.6% at the 1% significance level. 
This finding also confirms the theory as explained in Chapter 2. Split Recovery is a reform that 
allows States to collect a portion of the punitive damages awarded to plaintiffs. For instance, in 
1998, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a judgement allowing the State of Missouri to collect 
50% of the punitive damages awarded to plaintiffs (White 2002). For states that have enacted 
Punitive Damages Reform, Split Recovery further decreases the potential awards plaintiffs may 
receive. This reform will naturally have a larger impact on the demand for lawyers’ services 
although the short run supply remains inelastic. Therefore, Split Recovery Reform shifts the 
demand curve downward along the inelastic short-run supply curve. This leads to a substantial 
decrease in the Earnings of Lawyers although the Number of Lawyers may not be affected. 
 Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule 
The estimates show that Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule is negatively correlated with 
the Earnings of Lawyers at the 5% significance level. The enactment of this law decreases the 
Earnings of Lawyers by approximately 10.2%. These findings agree with theory because the law 
puts some requirements on the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted maliciously. 
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Consequently, the enactment of this law shifts the demand curve for lawyers downward along the 
short-run supply curve which leads to a considerable decrease in the Earnings of Lawyers. 
 Contingency Fee Rule 
Contrary to expectations, the estimates show that Contingency Fee Rule is positively 
correlated with the Earnings of Lawyers at the 1% significance level. The enactment of this law 
leads to a 13.5% increase in the Earnings of Lawyers. This may be because most of the attorney 
fees are collected before the application of any other rule. For instance in the case of Split 
Recovery, attorney fees are collected before the collection of any portion of the awards.  Since this 
caps most contingency fees at 30 to 33%, law firms may appoint the best lawyers to cases that 
have the potential of earning them larger revenues. Finally, there is a possibility for lawyers may 
find ways to circumvent this rule by charging the plaintiffs for special services or even increasing 
the hourly rates because of the complexity of the cases. In any case, this reform may lead to an 
upward shift in the demand curve. This results in higher Earnings of Lawyers.  
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7.2.3. The Impact of all Torts 
  Table 8: Impact of all Tort reforms and Total Punitive Damages  
 (Elasticities)  * p<0.05 ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001  
 Number of Lawyers  Earnings of Lawyers 
Non-Tort Variables   FGLS FGLS   PCSE  PCSE FE  FE 
Number of Lawyers t-1  0.98*** 0.984*** 0.970*** 0.970*** -0.012 -0.0104 
L3 AlternativeEarnings  - 0.16*** - 0.164*** -0.155*** - 0.146*** 0.132*** 0.198*** 
Real GDP per Cap  0.079*** 0.0663*** 0.0811*** - 0.078*** 0.007 -0.0221 
Violent Crime  - 0.012 - 0.00698 -0.0122 -0.009 0.055 0.0802* 
Property Crime  - 0.0023 -0.00695 0.0230 - 0.0127 0.047 0.0248 
Divorce  - 0.0292* - 0.0366** -0.0391* - 0.04** -0.042 -0.0453 
Number of Firms  0.015 0.0182 0.0151 0.0188 -0.0616 -0.0955 
Insurance Losses  0.036*** 0.0356*** 0.0328** 0.0346*** 0.0013 0.0119 
Bankruptcy Filings  0.036*** 0.0330*** 0.0254*** 0.0256*** -0.0203 -0.0166 
 Tort-variables     
Noneconomic  0.29  0.603  -4.945   
TotalDamages  -0.44  0.369  0  
CollateralSource  -0.21  -0.126  44.603  
PeriodicPayment  0.411  0.252  0.612  
ContingencyFee  -0.51  0.334  13.43***  
JointSeveralLiability  -0.90  -0.875  -2.65  
PatientCompensationFund  0.57  -0.186  -3.52  
ComparativeFault  0.14  0.205  0  
PunitiveDamagestotal -0.57 ---- -0.532  -6.29***  
Alltort  --- 0.068 ---- -0.025 --- -2.092* 
State Effect -0.031 -0.0295 -0.034 -0.0315 ---- ---- 
Year Effect -0.002 -0.04 0.0685 0.0405 0.166 0.062 
 
The results in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 show that some individual tort reforms have an 
impact on the Earnings of Lawyers although there is no evidence that they affect the Number of 
Lawyers. They distinctly show that Split Recovery and Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule 
decrease the Earnings of Lawyers. Since Split Recovery Rule and Punitive Damages (Evidence) 
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Rule are both additions to Caps on Punitive Damages, I estimated the model with a new variable. 
The PunitiveDamagesTotal is the sum of all three aspects of Punitive Damages. This variable will 
capture the total impact of Punitive Damages and all its additional reforms. I also evaluated the 
impact all tort reforms together. Alltort is a variable that captures the combined impacts of all tort 
reforms in the state. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 8 in which the first four 
columns show the estimates of the Number of Lawyers and the last two columns show those of 
the Earnings of Lawyers. 
 Based on the FGLS method, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show that there is no evidence 
that PunitiveDamagesTotal nor Alltort have any effect on the Number of Lawyers. The PCSE 
estimation results in Columns 3 and 4 also show that neither one of these variables has an impact 
on the Number of Lawyers. These findings agree with the findings in Table 4 and 5 as there was 
no evidence that any reform had an impact on the number of Lawyers.  
Columns 5 of Table 8 shows the results of the estimations of the Earnings of Lawyers. The 
findings show that PunitiveDamagesTotal significantly decreases the Earnings of Lawyers at the 
1% level. States that enact all three Punitive Damages reforms are likely to see the Earnings of 
Lawyers reduced by 6.29% although those who enact the Contingency Fee Rule may experience 
an increase in the Earnings of Lawyers by 13.5%. This decrease in the Earnings of Lawyers is 
much smaller than the individual impact displayed in Table 7. But one should understand that Split 
Recovery for instance, is a law that is enacted as part of Punitive Damages laws. Therefore, if a 
state has caps on Punitive Damages, the enactment of the Split Recovery will further decrease the 
potential plaintiffs’ awards. The results may be similar for the Punitive Damages (evidence) Rule. 
So these the large impacts these reforms may be inflated by the impact of the existing Caps on 
Punitive Damages.  
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Column 6 of Table 8 shows that Alltort significantly decreases the Earnings of Lawyers at the 10% 
level. States that enact all tort laws are likely to experience a decrease in the Earnings of Lawyers 
by 2.1%. This finding agree with the fact some reforms such as the Contingency Fee Rule may 
increase the Earnings of Lawyers although Split Recovery, and Punitive Damages (Evidence) rule 
decreases the earnings of Lawyers. There is an offsetting effect overall in the market for lawyers.        
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CHAPTER 8 CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION 
8.1. CRITIQUE 
The focus of this paper was to study the impact of tort reforms on the market for lawyers. 
I evaluated this market by using variables used in prior research. I added the tort variables to the 
model in order to gage their respective impacts. Although I found significant results, this paper 
does not address the possibility of the impact of the Number of Lawyers and the Earnings of 
Lawyers on tort reforms. There is a possibility that lawyers can impact legislation, particularly, 
tort reforms. One can argue that the number of lawyers, their earnings and whether they are 
organized in lobbies, can affect legislation. Perhaps future research can address this problem 
including a variable like the number of state legislators and governors that are businessmen or 
lawyer. 
This paper also considers the population of lawyers homogeneously. Because of 
specializations within the law profession, this paper fails to address the impact of these law changes 
on specific types of law practice. For instance, a change in law can have an effect on a specific 
type of practice by decreasing it. But if these lawyers can practice in another field by accepting the 
wages offered, they may simply have a decreasing effect on the Earnings of Lawyers but not the 
Number of Lawyers. Therefore, future research can definitely seek to isolate the impact of law 
changes on specific types of practices. 
8.2. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper was to evaluate the determinants of the market - supply and 
demand- for lawyers, including the specific impacts of tort reform. Tort is a wrongful act, not 
including a breach of contract or trust, that results in injury to another’s person, property, 
reputation, or the like, and for which the injured party is entitled to compensation. These laws 
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provide a way for plaintiffs to be awarded for damages caused to them by other parties 
(Individuals, businesses, governments). Since the demand for lawyers in a state depends to some 
extent on the number of expected recoveries for torts and the expected recovery per lawsuit, I 
assume that tort reform laws that put caps on awards, as well as other measures that favor 
defendants, will (1) affect the Number of Lawyers, and (2) affect the Earnings of Lawyers. 
I used the basic model established by Pashigian (1975) to develop the relationships between 
the Number of Lawyers, the Earnings of Lawyers, the Earnings of Alternative Professions, the 
Real GDP per Capita, the tort reform variables, and a set of other exogenous variables. I used the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squared as well as the Panel Corrected Standard Error methods to 
estimate the equation of the Number of Lawyers although I used the Fixed Effect Model to evaluate 
the equation of the Earnings of Lawyers. Some research, including Freeman (1971) and Pashigian 
(1975), evaluated the non-tort determinants of the market for lawyers including but not limited to 
GNP, GNP per Capita, Divorce Rate, number of New Firms, number of Bankruptcy Filed, number 
of New Cases filed, Insurance Losses per Registered Vehicle and Budget of Federal Regulatory 
agencies. Except for Browne and Schmit (2008), who evaluated the impact of tort reform on the 
use of attorneys and claim filings, other studies only addressed the impact of tort reforms on topics 
that may indirectly affect the market for lawyers. These studies included the impact of tort reform 
on the frequency of case filings (Lee et al. 1994), the number of claims and claims filings (Browne 
and Puelz 1996), the size and number of settlements in medical malpractice cases (Avraham 2007), 
and the number of accidental death rates (Rubin and Shepherd 2007). Although this paper 
addresses the impacts of non-tort determinants on the market for lawyers, its contribution perhaps 
is that it is the first, to my knowledge, to establish the direct impacts of tort reform laws on both 
the Number of Lawyers and the Earnings of Lawyers. 
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Consistent with theory and prior research, the results show that the Lagged Number of 
Lawyers is positively correlated with the Number of Lawyers at the 1% significance level although 
it shows no effect on the Earnings of Lawyers. The 0.969 elasticity of this variable with respect to 
the Number of Lawyers confirms Pashigian’s findings and supports the theory that the Number of 
Lawyers adjusts slowly to the changes in the market for Lawyers. 
Also, consistent with Freeman’s findings, I found that Lagged Alternative Earnings is 
negatively and significantly correlated with the Number of Lawyers at the 1% level with an 
elasticity of 0.140. This indicates that an increase in opportunities in Alternative Professions three 
years earlier affects the supply of lawyers as relatively fewer people enroll in law schools in favor 
of four-year degree professions. This research also found that the three-year Lagged Alternative 
Earnings increases the Earnings of Lawyers with an elasticity of 0.178. This finding is also in 
agrees with theory because this is supply side variable.  
Additionally, Real GDP per Capita, Divorce Rate, the Amount of Insurance Losses per 
Registered Vehicle, and the Number of Bankruptcy Filed at the Federal District Courts are 
significantly correlated with the Number of Lawyers although their impacts are statistically 
negligible16.  But I found no evidence that any of these variables have an impact on the Earnings 
of Lawyers. 
Although none of the basic estimations (FGLS and PCSE) revealed a significant impact of 
tort reform on the Number of Lawyers, combination of independent variables that excluded the 
Lagged Alternative Earnings show that Punitive Damages Caps negatively affected the number of 
Lawyers. But this result cannot be reliable because the difference in standard errors exposed the 
                                                 
16 Elasticity is less than 0.05.   
64 
 
 
 
importance of this variable (Earnings of Alternative Professions) as a determinant of the Number 
of Lawyers.   
 To capture the total impact of Punitive Damages as a reform that encompasses Caps on 
Punitive Damages, Split Recovery and Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule, I included 
PunitiveDamagesTotal. A similar variable, Alltort, was included to capture the total impact of all 
tort reforms. I found no evidence that PunitiveDamagesTotal, nor Alltort have any impacts on the 
Number of Lawyers. This means that states that have implemented all “three Punitive Damages 
Reforms,” or all tort reforms combined, experienced no change in the Number of Lawyers.  
Moreover, I found Split-Recovery Rule and Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule are 
significant and negatively correlated with the Earnings of Lawyers. The enactment of the Split 
Recovery Rule decreases the Earnings of Lawyers by 17.6% although Punitive Damages 
(Evidence) Rule decreases the Earnings of Lawyers by 10.2%. However, I found that Contingency 
Fee Rule increases the Earnings of Lawyers by 13.5%. Perhaps, this is because attorneys’ fees are 
usually collected before the application of any existing rule such as the Split recovery Rule. 
Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule and Split-Recovery Rule have the largest impacts on the 
Earnings of Lawyers because they both add new rules to the Caps on Punitive Damages. Split-
Recovery, specifically, allows some states to collect between 50 and 75% of Punitive Damages 
awarded to plaintiffs even though Punitive Damages may already have caps.  
Finally, I found that when states pass all three Punitive Damages reforms, the Earnings of 
Lawyers decrease by 6.29% although States that pass all tort reform only see a decrease in the 
Earnings of Lawyers by 2.1%. These two results show that in the market for lawyers, individual 
tort reform may affect the market in one direction or another. However, their total impacts show 
that they may be offsetting each other.  
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APPENDIX A 
THE STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE US 
A. The Number of Lawyers per Capita 
Table 10: Number of Lawyers and U.S GDP per Capita  
Year  
Number of 
Lawyers  
U.S population   
(Millions)  
GDP per 
Capita  
Real GDP per Capita 
 (2009 dollars)  
1940  181,220  132.2  1.4     
1950  221,605  151.3  1.5               14,886   
1960  285,933  179.3  1.6               16,938   
1970  326,842  203.2  1.6               22,841   
1980  574,810  226.5  2.5               28,957   
1990  755,694  248.7  3.0               35,941   
2000  1,022,462  281.4  3.6               44,721   
2010  1,203,097  308.7  3.9               48,074   
Sources:   
The American Bar Association: National Lawyer Population Survey (Historical Trend in Total 
National Lawyer Population 1878-2016)  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/total- 
national-lawyer-population-1878-2016.authcheckdam.pdf  US Population:  
Real GDP /Capita FRED Saint Louis: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A939RX0Q048SBEA.  
 
 
Between 1940 and 2010, the numbers of lawyers in the United States increased by more 
than 6 folds while the population of the United States only increased by 2.3 folds. Thus, the number 
of lawyers per capita nearly tripled in those 70 years. However, during the period between 1980 
and 2010, the number of lawyers per capita increased by a factor of 1.56. This period was also 
characterized many legal reforms. Many states made changes to the tort laws. During the same 
period the Real GDP per Capita in the United States increased by a factor of nearly 1.7. As a 
significant determinant of the demand for lawyers (Pashagian 1977), the growth of the Real GDP 
per Capita mirrored that of the number of lawyers per capita.  
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B. Lawyers Demographics. 
The statistics described and cited in this section are based on the American Bar Association 
reports 
(http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/lawyerdemograph
ics-tables-2016.authcheckdam.pdf). 
Although the Number of Lawyers has increased over the last two decades, the legal 
profession has become a lot more diverse over time. Firstly, the profession has seen an increase in 
the number of women over the last 10 years. Based on the figures provided by the American Bar 
Association the percentage of women in legal profession increased from 29% to 31% between 
2000 and 2010. In year 2016, this figure stands at 36%. Although the ratio of women has increased 
over time, the percentage of women that are equity partners stood only at 17.4% in 2015 (NALP 
bulletin March 2016.http://www.nalp.org/0316research). 
Secondly, the profession has also seen an increase in the ratio of its minority population 
over the last decade. The ratio of African American has increased from 4% in 2000 to 5% in 2010 
while that of Hispanic has increased from 3 to 4% over the same decade. Other minorities including 
Asian Pacific American, not Hispanic American Indian, not Hispanic native Hawaiian and Pacific 
Islander not Hispanic still represent less than 2% of the overall population of lawyers. Although 
underrepresented in the total lawyer population, the NALP bulletin of March 2016 shows that all 
minorities account for 5.6% of equity partners in law firms. 
The age distribution in the legal profession has changed over the last two decades. The 
lawyers’ population between the age 45 and 54 years old increased while other age ranges 
decreased. This ratio went from 16% in 1980 to 28% in 2000. In 2005 the median age of a lawyers 
was 49 years old. This increased from 45 years old in year 2000 and 39 years old in 1980. This 
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may be indicative of the experience level of the typical lawyer and can be considered as a potential 
determinant of the earnings of individual lawyers (Rosen 1992). 
The distribution of the lawyer population by practice type has been steady in the United 
States. In 1980, the private sector employed 68% of all lawyers while the government, private 
industry, the judiciary and education employed 9, 10, 4 and 1% respectively. Although private 
practice increased slightly by 1%, the sectors of government, private industry and judiciary each 
decreased by 1% by year 2000. The sector of Education remained at 1%. 
Solo practitioners consistently represented the largest portion (45 to 49%) of private 
practitioners between 1980 and 2005. The practices with 2 to 5 lawyers represented 15% of all 
private practitioners in 2005, down from 22% in 1980. Between 1980 and 2005, this ratio 
decreased from 9 to 6% for practices with 6 to 10 lawyers. Over the same period, this ratio for 
practices of 11 to 20 lawyers decreased from 7% to 6% while that for practices with 21 to 50 
lawyers remained at 6%. Although the ratio for practices of 51 to 100 lawyers decreased from 7% 
to 4% in the interval, it is important to note that the largest firms (101 of more lawyers) grew as 
portion of private practitioners from 13% in 1991 to 16% in 2005. 
The largest number of law firms was within practices with 2 to 5 lawyers and represented 
76% of all law firms in 2005. This was followed by practices with 6 to 10 lawyers representing 
13% of the total number of firms.  The large law firms (21 or more employees) represented only 
5% of the total number of firms although the largest law firms, particularly the firms with 101 or 
more lawyers, represented 1% of the total number of law firms. 
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C. The Number of First Year Law Students  
Table 11: Legal Education and Admission to Bar  
Year  
Number of 
Law 
Schools  
First Year 
Enrollment  
Total J.D 
Enrollment  
Total Law  
School  
Enrollment  
J.D or LL.B  
Awarded  
1970  146  
           
34,289   
             
78,018   
             
82,041   
             
17,477   
1980  171  
           
42,296   
           
119,501   
           
125,397   
             
35,059   
1990  175  
           
44,104   
           
125,261   
           
132,433   
             
36,385   
2000  183  
           
43,518   
           
125,173   
           
132,464   
             
38,157   
2010  200  
           
52,488   
           
147,525   
           
157,298   
             
44,258   
Sources: Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963-2012  
American Bar Association (Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar) 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_ad
mi ssions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 
 
During the las three decades characterized by the increase in Real GDP per Capita, both 
the number of law schools and the number of first year students also increased. In the last four 
decades leading to 2010, the number of law schools increased from 146 to 200 (or a 36%). 
Particularly, between 1980 and 2010 the number of law schools increased from 171 to 200; this is 
a 17% increase. During that period, the number of First-year students increased by 24% although 
the enrollment in law schools increased by 25.4%. However, in the same period, the number of J. 
D or LL.Bs awarded also increased by approximately 26%. These numbers are consistent with the 
idea that real GDP may be a determinant of the demand of lawyers. On one hand, the higher 
demand may have led to higher earnings for lawyers. On the other hand, the increase in the number 
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of law schools and first year students may have been a response to this increase in the earnings for 
lawyers. Therefore, the supply of lawyers increased through higher number of JD and LL.Bs. 
D. Employment and Salary Trends for New Lawyers  
 Table 12: Salary Trends for New Lawyers  
Employment 
Full 
Time   All  
Academi
c  
Busines
s  
Judicial 
Clerkshi
p  
Govern
ment  
Private    
Practice  
Public     
Interest  
92%  82%  25.5 23.2  27.5  21.9  22.5  29.5  17.5  
90%  82%  30.6 26.8  32.1  22.9  23  38.3  19.8  
87%  71%  26.2 23  28.2  22.3  21.7  32.8  19.2  
92%  77%  30.1 23.2  34.8  23.7  23.3  50  20  
90%    30.7 23  30.7  23  23.7  43.5  20.5  
88%     28.9 21.5  29.8  23.8  23.8  47.7  19.7  
Sources: National Association of Law 
Placement (Salary Trends for New Lawyers). 
http://www.nalp.org/0115research 
http://www.nalp.org/1016research  
  
 
 
After law schools, and in most cases the bar exam, lawyers take employment in academic, 
judicial, government, private and public interest practices. Based on the surveys done by the 
National Association of Law Placement, the employment of newly graduated lawyers had been 
high between the 1985 and 2010. In 1985, 91.50 % of newly graduated lawyers were employed 
and 81.60 % were employed full time.  By 1995, this employment rate decreased to 86.70% 
(70.77% full time) before increasing to 91.50% (77.30% full time) in 2000. The employment rate 
decreased to 87.60% by 2010. The average annual real full time salary was nearly 25,500 dollars 
for new lawyers in 1985 (CPI 1986). This salary increased by 20% to nearly 31,000 dollars in 
1990. In 1995, the real full time salary had decreased back to nearly 27,000 dollars before 
increasing to its 1990 level of between 29 and 31,000 dollars. These patterns of employment and 
salary can attest to the behavior of the supply and demand of lawyers. Between 1990 and 2000 the 
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legal profession had seen high wages while the periods of low employment rates had seen 
relatively lower wages. 
E. Earnings of Lawyers by Firm Size  
Evans and Leighton (1989) found that better educated and more stable workers work in 
larger firms. Per Bruck and cantor (2008), law firms grew as they competed for top dollar and 
clients and big profitable projects. In responding to the demand of the clients, these law firms had 
to compete for talented new graduates although, elite law schools were not adequately responding 
to this demand. Therefore, the authors noted, that this scarcity created a seller’s market for elite 
new graduates which led to a spiraling starting salaries for those large law firms. 
Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar (2008) argued that large law firms hire graduate students from 
the best law schools as they serve corporate clients in difficult and complex transactions. Although 
they are perceived as prestigious law firms, they charge high hourly fees leading to high revenues. 
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F. Earnings of Lawyers by Geography  
Table 13: Median Starting Salaries for First Year Associates  
Median Starting Salaries for First Year Associates by Firm Size  
    
Year  2 to 10  11 to 25  26 to 50  51 to 100  101 to 250  
251 or 
more  
1995  
            
29,475   
           
29,475   
              
32,750   
              
38,973   
            
38,318   
            
45,850   
2000  
            
34,798   
           
34,798   
              
36,538   
              
40,597   
            
43,497   
            
64,086   
2005  
            
34,538   
           
34,538   
              
40,933   
              
43,492   
            
46,050   
            
61,400   
2010  
            
33,029   
           
33,029   
              
43,579   
              
43,579   
            
48,167   
            
59,635   
2014  
            
29,825   
           
29,825   
              
46,053   
              
48,246   
            
46,053   
            
57,018   
Sources: National Association for Law Placement.  
http://www.nalp.org/1014research?s=How%20much%20do%20Law%20firms%20pa
y%20ass ociates%3F.  
 
Based on the tables provided by the National Association of Law Placement, the salaries 
of First Year Associates (lawyers) increased between 1995 and 2010 for all firm sizes. During that 
period, practices with 2 to 25 employees increased their starting salaries by 12% while practices 
with 26 to 50 employees saw an increase of 33%. Although the starting salaries in firms with 51 
to 100 employees grew by 11%, those of the largest firms (101 and more) increased by 25 to 30% 
between 1995 and 2010. It is important to note that starting salaries are much larger in larger size 
firms. The differential gap is noticeably clear as one move from smaller size firms to larger size 
firms. For instance, in 1995 the starting salary for law firms with 26 to 50 employees was $32,750. 
This was 11% higher than that of firms with 25 or less employees.  During the same year, firms 
with 51 to 250 employees had a starting salary 30 to 32% higher than that of the smaller firms. 
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However, the starting salary of the largest firms (251 or more) was $45,850. This was 55% greater 
than the starting salary of the smallest firms (2 to 25).   
Table 14: Median Starting Salaries for First Year Associates in Largest Firms  
Median Starting Salaries for First Year Associates in Largest Firms  
  
Year  Chicago  Los Angeles  New York  Washington DC  
1995  N/A             45,850   
              
55,675                46,996   
2000  
            
68,145              72,495   
              
72,495                66,145   
2005  
            
63,958              63,958   
              
63,958                63,958   
2010  
            
61,929              66,516   
              
73,397                66,516   
2014  
            
66,667              63,596   
              
70,175                69,079   
Sources: National Association for Law Placement 
http://www.nalp.org/1014research?s=How%20much%20do%20Law%20firm.  
 
Heinz et al. (2006) argued that based on the data of “Urban Lawyers,” a greater proportion 
of lawyers in Chicago were dedicating their time to corporate clients. They noted that this 
phenomenon may be due to the increase in corporate interests in North American society. Firms 
in the four largest employment markets are in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York and Washington 
D.C (http://www.nalp.org/1014research). In 2016, these four markets represent 30% of the top 350 
largest law firms in the U.S with the city of New York representing 13% 
(https://www.ilrg.com/nlj250?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q%5Bname_cont%5D=&q%5Boffice_in%5 
D=&q%5Boffice_state_in%5D=&commit=Search). In those markets, the nominal salaries have 
consistently increased over the last 20 years (1995-2014). In fact, all the salaries had nominally 
doubled in Chicago, Los Angeles and Washington DC. However, in New York, the nominal 
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salaries have not doubled during that period because the median had been considerably higher than 
those of the other three cities. In 1995 the median starting salary for New York was 21% higher 
than that of Los Angeles and 18% higher than that of Washington DC 
(http://www.nalp.org/1014research). However, these salaries were considerably higher than the 
average for the industry.  The starting salary for New York was 2.1 times higher than the average 
for the industry while Los Angeles and Washington DC were 1.75 and 1.79 times higher than the 
average industry respectively. 
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G. Law Firms Revenues 
Table 15: Revenues of Offices of Lawyers  
Revenues of Offices of Lawyers  
(Millions)  
Year  
  
Revenues  
(Millions)  
Percentage 
change  
1998           142,495     
1999           151,303   6.2  
2000           158,951   5.1  
2001           162,958     
2002           170,808   4.8  
2003           186,044   8.9  
2004           193,499   4  
2005           201,717   4.2  
2006           212,524   5.4  
2007           227,768   5.9  
2008           232,770   2.1  
2009           226,033   -3  
2010           229,082     
2011           237,082     
2012           239,312     
2013           233,576    
 
Base on the data by the U.S census Bureau, the annual revenues of law firms consistently 
increased between 1998 and 2012. They have increased by more than 67% over that period from 
nearly 143 billion dollars to nearly 240 billion dollars in 2012. However, the largest law firms 
account for a considerable portion of the total law firms’ revenues. In 2014 for instance, per Chris 
Johnson (May 2005), the top 100 firms had a total revenue of 81 billion dollars with an average 
revenue per lawyer of $871,958 and an average profit per partner of 1.5 million dollars. Based on 
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Chris Johnson’s report, in 2013 the total revenue of the top law firms stood at 77.43 billion dollars 
which accounted for nearly 33% of the total revenues of the industry in the U.S.    
76 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 Table 1:  Description of variables  
Non-tort variables  Description  
Number of Lawyers  Dependent variable. The number of lawyers per 100,000 
people at time t.  
Earnings of Lawyers  Dependent variable. The real earnings of lawyers.  
LagNumberLawyers  Number of Lawyers per 100,000 people at time t-1  
Earnings Alternative  Earnings of Alternative Professions.   
Real GDP per Cap  Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita  
Violent crime  Number of violent crime per 100,000 People  
Property Crime  Number of property crime per 1000,000 People  
Divorce  Number of divorce   
Number of Firms  Number of new firms incorporated during the year.   
Insurance Losses  Amount of insurance losses per registered vehicle  
Bankruptcy Filings  Number of bankruptcy filed at the federal district courts 
per 100,000 people.   
Description of Tort reform variables  
  Definition  
Noneconomic  Caps on noneconomic damages awards  
PunitiveDamages  Caps on punitive damages awards  
TotalDamages  Caps on total damages awards  
Split Recovery  Split recovery rule  
CollateralSource  Collateral Source Rule  
PunitiveEvidence   Punitive damages (evidence) rule  
PeriodicPayment  Periodic payment rule  
ContingencyFee  Contingency fee rule  
JointSeveralLiability  Joint and several liability rule  
PatientCompensationFund  Patient compensation fund  
ComparativeFault  Comparative fault rule  
PunitiveDamagesTotal  Sum of all punitive damages reforms  
Alltort  Sum of all tort reforms  
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Table 2: Summary statistics (non-tort reform variables).  
    Variable           Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
              
number_law~s   
                                                          
        860     5.06083    .5588771   3.935303   8.505065 
earnings_l~s           861    3.759795     .201705   3.175922    4.29064 
alt_earnin~2           867    2.894528    .1153567   2.641918   3.279234 
violent_cr~e           867    5.911473    .5063812   4.203382   7.449234 
  prop_crime           867    8.057749    .2696012   7.329324   8.870244 
               
realgdp_cap   
                                                          
        867    3.822602    .2515826   3.363293   5.130741 
     divorce           782    1.324062    .2485681   .4054651   2.292535 
number_firms           816    7.667795    .1819182   7.301538   8.150354 
insurance_~s           612    5.496794    .3627028   4.459054   6.712271 
bankruptcy~d           867    5.993302    .4651388   4.129815   7.032542 
  
 Table 3: Summary statistics (tort reform variables).  
    Variable           Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
              
noneconomi~s   
                                                          
        765    .4156863    .4931624          0          1 
punitive_d~s           765    .5202614    .4999162          0          1 
total_dama~s           765    .1176471    .3224005          0          1 
split_reco~y           765    .1346405    .3415625          0          1 
              
collatera_~e   
                                                          
        765    .6379085    .4809195          0          1 
evidence_p~e           765    .6771242    .4678816          0          1 
periodic_p~t           765    .9673203    .8892781          0          2 
contingenc~e           765    .3633987    .4812929          0          1 
              
joint_seve~l   
                                                          
        765    .7424837    .4375522          0          1 
patientcom~d           765    .2470588    .4315834          0          1 
  comp_fault           765    1.941176    1.037486          0          3 
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Table 9: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Lawyers and real GDP per Capita (log)- All states  
 
  
bankruptcy~d    -0.2026   0.0032  -0.1303  -0.3608  -0.3877   0.3551   0.0958   0.3092   0.0323   1.0000
insurance_~s     0.4227   0.5354   0.5337   0.3387  -0.2035  -0.0138   0.4731   0.1995   1.0000
  prop_crime     0.1690   0.2125  -0.0054   0.0715  -0.2838   0.2294   0.6362   1.0000
violent_cr~e     0.4147   0.4828   0.2576   0.3765  -0.3436  -0.0574   1.0000
     divorce    -0.4049  -0.3822  -0.4072  -0.4519  -0.1250   1.0000
 numberfirms     0.3050  -0.1903   0.1391   0.3660   1.0000
 realgdp_cap     0.8203   0.5754   0.6850   1.0000
L3_alt_ear~2     0.5901   0.6460   1.0000
earnings_l~s     0.5432   1.0000
number_law~s     1.0000
                                                                                                        
               numbe~rs ear~yers L3_alt~2 realgd~p numbe~ms  divorce violen~e prop_c~e insura~s bankru~d
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Figure 3: Log Mean Number of Lawyers (All States)  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Log Real Median Earnings of Lawyers – All states.  
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Figure 5: Log Median Earnings of Alternative Professions  
 
 
Figure 6: Log Median Earnings of Bachelor degree Holders –All States  
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Figure 7: Distribution of the Number of Lawyers – All states.  
 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of the Earnings of Lawyers –All states  
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APPENDIX C 
ESTIMATIONS RESULTS 
Estimation Results: Number of Lawyers (FGLS).  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                           
N                500          500          500          500          500   
                                                                           
             (-0.70)      (-0.71)      (-0.97)      (-0.87)      (-0.03)   
_cons         -0.201       -0.201       -0.221       -0.185      -0.0673   
                                                                 (-1.24)   
stateid                                                        -0.000289   
                                                                 (-0.04)   
year                                                           -0.0000381   
              (0.07)       (0.07)      (-0.21)      (-0.14)       (0.26)   
comp_fault  0.000300     0.000300    -0.000668    -0.000428     0.000795   
             (-0.40)      (-0.41)       (0.49)       (0.41)       (0.78)   
patientc~d  -0.00387     -0.00387      0.00367      0.00287      0.00574   
             (-0.65)      (-0.67)      (-0.96)      (-1.00)      (-1.05)   
joint_se~l  -0.00652     -0.00652     -0.00753     -0.00743     -0.00782   
              (0.39)       (0.40)      (-0.68)      (-0.71)      (-0.53)   
continge~e   0.00368      0.00368     -0.00560     -0.00545     -0.00410   
              (0.65)       (0.66)       (1.13)       (1.29)       (1.04)   
periodic~t   0.00301      0.00301      0.00461      0.00494      0.00404   
              (0.54)       (0.55)       (0.04)       (0.03)      (-0.15)   
evidence~e   0.00546      0.00546     0.000362     0.000233     -0.00126   
             (-0.05)      (-0.05)      (-0.02)      (-0.04)      (-0.32)   
collater~e -0.000459    -0.000459    -0.000149    -0.000344     -0.00253   
             (-0.95)      (-0.97)      (-0.83)      (-0.85)      (-0.61)   
split_re~y   -0.0114      -0.0114     -0.00809     -0.00773     -0.00569   
              (0.56)       (0.57)      (-0.11)      (-0.08)      (-0.11)   
total_da~s   0.00802      0.00802     -0.00151     -0.00107     -0.00137   
             (-1.09)      (-1.12)      (-1.53)      (-1.51)      (-1.50)   
punitive~s  -0.00860     -0.00860     -0.00940     -0.00872     -0.00860   
              (0.42)       (0.43)       (0.25)       (0.23)       (0.35)   
nonecono~s   0.00357      0.00357      0.00180      0.00158      0.00238   
              (2.32)       (2.37)       (4.89)       (5.17)       (4.90)   
bankrupt~d    0.0231**     0.0231**     0.0362***    0.0363***    0.0360***
              (2.26)       (2.31)       (3.03)       (3.20)       (3.19)   
insuranc~s    0.0313**     0.0313**     0.0347***    0.0348***    0.0344***
              (0.51)       (0.52)       (0.95)       (0.98)       (0.60)   
numberfi~s    0.0149       0.0149       0.0209       0.0201       0.0135   
             (-1.80)      (-1.84)      (-1.46)      (-1.56)      (-1.66)   
divorce      -0.0371*     -0.0371*     -0.0261      -0.0263      -0.0282*  
              (0.69)       (0.71)      (-0.15)      (-0.25)      (-0.02)   
prop_crime    0.0147       0.0147     -0.00257     -0.00398    -0.000252   
             (-0.64)      (-0.65)      (-0.69)      (-0.73)      (-1.11)   
violent_~e  -0.00810     -0.00810     -0.00742     -0.00729      -0.0116   
              (2.62)       (2.67)       (3.11)       (3.12)       (3.14)   
realgdp_~p    0.0833***    0.0833***    0.0809***    0.0769***    0.0771***
             (-2.39)      (-2.44)      (-3.31)      (-3.58)      (-3.46)   
L3_alt_e~2    -0.132**     -0.132**     -0.149***    -0.157***    -0.151***
             (77.69)      (79.37)      (99.69)     (107.05)     (107.52)   
Lag1numb~s     0.965***     0.965***     0.978***     0.981***     0.981***
                                                                           
           number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s   
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)   
                                                                           
. esttab, star ( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 ) compress
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Estimation Results: Number of Lawyers (PCSE)  
 
  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                           
N                500          500          500          500          500   
                                                                           
             (-0.45)      (-0.38)      (-0.73)      (-0.60)      (-0.58)   
_cons         -0.115      -0.0945       -0.201       -0.154       -1.488   
                                                                 (-1.06)   
stateid                                                        -0.000294   
                                                                  (0.53)   
year                                                            0.000647   
              (0.22)       (0.26)       (0.08)       (0.16)       (0.37)   
comp_fault  0.000838     0.000955     0.000300     0.000600      0.00141   
             (-0.57)      (-0.62)      (-0.43)      (-0.52)      (-0.18)   
patientc~d  -0.00493     -0.00521     -0.00387     -0.00442     -0.00157   
             (-0.73)      (-0.76)      (-0.67)      (-0.71)      (-0.79)   
joint_se~l  -0.00654     -0.00654     -0.00652     -0.00653     -0.00723   
              (0.44)       (0.46)       (0.38)       (0.41)       (0.43)   
continge~e   0.00369      0.00370      0.00368      0.00368      0.00391   
              (0.89)       (0.96)       (0.61)       (0.73)       (0.54)   
periodic~t   0.00367      0.00383      0.00301      0.00336      0.00256   
              (0.56)       (0.56)       (0.55)       (0.55)       (0.25)   
evidence~e   0.00500      0.00489      0.00546      0.00521      0.00241   
             (-0.04)      (-0.03)      (-0.05)      (-0.04)      (-0.16)   
collater~e -0.000291    -0.000254    -0.000459    -0.000366     -0.00149   
             (-1.06)      (-1.09)      (-1.05)      (-1.11)      (-0.95)   
split_re~y   -0.0113      -0.0112      -0.0114      -0.0113     -0.00990   
              (0.62)       (0.64)       (0.50)       (0.53)       (0.47)   
total_da~s   0.00796      0.00792      0.00802      0.00801      0.00696   
             (-1.02)      (-1.00)      (-1.06)      (-1.03)      (-1.12)   
punitive~s  -0.00715     -0.00680     -0.00860     -0.00782     -0.00847   
              (0.39)       (0.39)       (0.41)       (0.40)       (0.54)   
nonecono~s   0.00298      0.00283      0.00357      0.00326      0.00449   
              (2.59)       (2.66)       (2.41)       (2.55)       (2.64)   
bankrupt~d    0.0233***    0.0234***    0.0231**     0.0232**     0.0250***
              (2.40)       (2.44)       (2.21)       (2.28)       (2.33)   
insuranc~s    0.0302**     0.0300**     0.0313**     0.0306**     0.0310** 
              (0.45)       (0.43)       (0.56)       (0.53)       (0.56)   
numberfi~s    0.0116       0.0109       0.0149       0.0131       0.0151   
             (-1.91)      (-1.95)      (-1.76)      (-1.82)      (-1.88)   
divorce      -0.0355*     -0.0352*     -0.0371*     -0.0362*     -0.0376*  
              (0.57)       (0.54)       (0.67)       (0.61)       (0.86)   
prop_crime    0.0109      0.00993       0.0147       0.0126       0.0184   
             (-0.72)      (-0.75)      (-0.63)      (-0.68)      (-0.92)   
violent_~e  -0.00818     -0.00820     -0.00810     -0.00814      -0.0116   
              (2.62)       (2.63)       (2.71)       (2.71)       (2.71)   
realgdp_~p    0.0752***    0.0735***    0.0833***    0.0787***    0.0788***
             (-2.77)      (-2.88)      (-2.26)      (-2.46)      (-2.51)   
L3_alt_e~2    -0.145***    -0.149***    -0.132**     -0.139**     -0.140** 
             (87.79)      (90.57)      (86.66)      (93.02)      (93.26)   
Lag1numb~s     0.973***     0.975***     0.965***     0.970***     0.969***
                                                                           
           number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s   
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)   
                                                                           
. esttab, star ( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 ) compress
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Estimation Results: Number of Lawyers (PCSE)  
 . 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                                  
N                500          544          500          500          500          544          500          500   
                                                                                                                  
             (-0.58)       (1.32)      (-0.88)      (-0.18)      (-0.03)       (0.60)      (-0.38)       (0.43)   
_cons         -1.488        3.928       -2.255       -0.430      -0.0673        1.338       -0.751        0.788   
             (-1.06)      (-0.43)      (-0.91)      (-0.83)      (-1.24)      (-1.25)      (-1.15)      (-1.17)   
stateid    -0.000294    -0.000146    -0.000252    -0.000219    -0.000289    -0.000345    -0.000266    -0.000261   
              (0.53)      (-1.60)       (0.82)       (0.19)      (-0.04)      (-0.89)       (0.33)      (-0.41)   
year        0.000647     -0.00228     0.000994     0.000222    -0.0000381    -0.000932     0.000304    -0.000363   
              (0.37)      (-1.18)       (0.37)       (0.54)       (0.26)      (-1.32)       (0.31)       (0.38)   
comp_fault   0.00141     -0.00581      0.00143      0.00206     0.000795     -0.00531     0.000961      0.00117   
             (-0.18)       (0.33)      (-0.27)      (-0.40)       (0.78)       (1.55)       (0.32)       (0.53)   
patientc~d  -0.00157      0.00330     -0.00238     -0.00340      0.00574       0.0134      0.00232      0.00350   
             (-0.79)      (-0.79)      (-0.68)      (-0.67)      (-1.05)      (-0.82)      (-0.85)      (-0.90)   
joint_se~l  -0.00723     -0.00880     -0.00627     -0.00612     -0.00782     -0.00755     -0.00643     -0.00659   
              (0.43)       (1.32)       (0.79)       (0.34)      (-0.53)       (0.67)      (-0.08)      (-0.42)   
continge~e   0.00391       0.0169      0.00714      0.00314     -0.00410      0.00670    -0.000591     -0.00318   
              (0.54)      (-1.39)       (0.30)       (0.54)       (1.04)      (-1.26)       (0.77)       (0.98)   
periodic~t   0.00256     -0.00747      0.00143      0.00261      0.00404     -0.00597      0.00300      0.00382   
              (0.25)       (1.11)       (0.54)       (0.35)      (-0.15)       (0.92)       (0.23)       (0.13)   
evidence~e   0.00241       0.0121      0.00514      0.00333     -0.00126      0.00873      0.00192      0.00104   
             (-0.16)      (-0.71)      (-0.33)      (-0.04)      (-0.32)      (-0.31)      (-0.74)      (-0.23)   
collater~e  -0.00149     -0.00749     -0.00309    -0.000397     -0.00253     -0.00277     -0.00587     -0.00186   
             (-0.95)       (0.90)      (-0.94)      (-0.98)      (-0.61)       (1.01)      (-0.43)      (-0.59)   
split_re~y  -0.00990       0.0172     -0.00984      -0.0102     -0.00569       0.0143     -0.00400     -0.00544   
              (0.47)       (1.09)       (0.83)       (0.65)      (-0.11)       (0.53)       (0.70)       (0.39)   
total_da~s   0.00696       0.0197       0.0120      0.00933     -0.00137      0.00842      0.00851      0.00471   
             (-1.12)      (-2.02)      (-1.17)      (-1.14)      (-1.50)      (-2.40)      (-1.54)      (-1.65)   
punitive~s  -0.00847      -0.0196**   -0.00882     -0.00864     -0.00860      -0.0180**   -0.00896     -0.00950*  
              (0.54)       (1.71)      (-0.02)       (0.33)       (0.35)       (1.52)      (-0.37)       (0.11)   
nonecono~s   0.00449       0.0180*   -0.000198      0.00263      0.00238       0.0130     -0.00245     0.000767   
              (2.64)       (1.30)       (2.06)       (2.48)       (4.90)       (2.63)       (4.11)       (4.80)   
bankrupt~d    0.0250***    0.0168       0.0186**     0.0221**     0.0360***    0.0253***    0.0289***    0.0334***
              (2.33)       (2.42)       (1.85)       (2.00)       (3.19)       (2.15)       (2.30)       (2.71)   
insuranc~s    0.0310**     0.0327**     0.0234*      0.0233**     0.0344***    0.0252**     0.0237**     0.0260***
              (0.56)       (0.89)       (1.32)                    (0.60)       (0.94)       (1.03)                
numberfi~s    0.0151       0.0300       0.0351                    0.0135       0.0266       0.0228                
             (-1.88)      (-1.02)      (-1.97)      (-1.71)      (-1.66)      (-0.31)      (-1.74)      (-1.29)   
divorce      -0.0376*     -0.0237      -0.0395**    -0.0313*     -0.0282*    -0.00611      -0.0301*     -0.0203   
              (0.86)       (1.16)       (0.67)       (0.11)      (-0.02)       (0.52)      (-0.12)      (-1.32)   
prop_crime    0.0184       0.0303       0.0146      0.00179    -0.000252       0.0106     -0.00196      -0.0166   
             (-0.92)      (-1.10)      (-0.04)                   (-1.11)      (-1.33)      (-0.16)                
violent_~e   -0.0116      -0.0188    -0.000543                   -0.0116      -0.0180     -0.00164                
              (2.71)       (3.34)                    (2.62)       (3.14)       (3.50)                    (2.98)   
realgdp_~p    0.0788***     0.120***                 0.0734***    0.0771***     0.103***                 0.0713***
             (-2.51)                   (-1.56)      (-2.31)      (-3.46)                   (-2.10)      (-3.31)   
L3_alt_e~2    -0.140**                 -0.0769       -0.130**     -0.151***                -0.0832**     -0.144***
             (93.26)      (60.37)     (118.32)     (100.71)     (107.52)      (72.02)     (138.99)     (114.82)   
Lag1numb~s     0.969***     0.920***     0.985***     0.972***     0.981***     0.942***     0.998***     0.984***
                                                                                                                  
           number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s   
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)          (7)          (8)   
                                                                                                                  
. esttab, star ( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 ) compress
85 
 
 
 
Estimation Results: Earnings of Lawyers (FE)  
 
  
. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
t statistics in parentheses
                                                              
N                501          501          501          501   
                                                              
              (9.72)       (5.14)       (3.91)      (-0.16)   
_cons          3.817***     3.739***     3.739***    -1.754   
                                                     (0.50)   
year                                                0.00239   
             (-0.11)          (.)          (.)          (.)   
comp_fault -0.000658            0            0            0   
             (-1.52)      (-0.88)      (-1.12)      (-1.15)   
patientc~d   -0.0203      -0.0511      -0.0511      -0.0525   
             (-4.02)      (-1.03)      (-0.89)      (-0.86)   
joint_se~l   -0.0550***   -0.0302      -0.0302      -0.0298   
              (7.21)       (2.96)       (6.13)       (5.20)   
continge~e    0.0927***     0.139***     0.139***     0.135***
              (2.25)       (0.46)       (0.45)       (0.47)   
periodic~t    0.0142**    0.00774      0.00774      0.00812   
              (2.95)      (-1.35)      (-1.75)      (-1.75)   
evidence~e    0.0406***   -0.0958      -0.0958*     -0.0970*  
              (2.20)       (1.43)       (1.19)       (1.18)   
collater~e    0.0267**     0.0715       0.0715       0.0710   
              (1.68)      (-4.47)      (-4.01)      (-4.02)   
split_re~y    0.0275*      -0.157***    -0.157***    -0.162***
              (3.47)          (.)          (.)          (.)   
total_da~s    0.0686***         0            0            0   
              (0.88)       (0.09)       (0.07)       (0.02)   
punitive~s   0.00944      0.00230      0.00230     0.000869   
             (-2.59)      (-2.51)      (-1.40)      (-1.40)   
nonecono~s   -0.0301***   -0.0605**    -0.0605      -0.0620   
              (0.54)      (-1.83)      (-1.53)      (-1.47)   
bankrupt~d   0.00731      -0.0242*     -0.0242      -0.0211   
              (3.53)      (-0.13)      (-0.14)      (-0.20)   
insuranc~s    0.0669***  -0.00420     -0.00420     -0.00623   
             (-9.11)      (-1.27)      (-0.62)      (-0.10)   
numberfi~s    -0.364***    -0.133       -0.133      -0.0301   
             (-5.04)      (-0.81)      (-0.79)      (-0.54)   
divorce       -0.141***   -0.0421      -0.0421      -0.0281   
              (2.42)       (0.77)       (0.41)       (0.60)   
prop_crime    0.0702**     0.0398       0.0398       0.0567   
             (-0.17)       (1.53)       (0.97)       (0.93)   
violent_~e  -0.00305       0.0507       0.0507       0.0488   
              (4.54)       (0.53)       (0.46)       (0.02)   
realgdp_~p     0.198***    0.0488       0.0488      0.00299   
              (4.38)       (3.04)       (3.90)       (3.70)   
L3_alt_e~2     0.330***     0.191***     0.191***     0.178***
              (2.52)      (-0.22)      (-0.10)      (-0.17)   
Lag1numb~s    0.0428**   -0.00815     -0.00815      -0.0138   
                                                              
           earn~yers    earn~yers    earn~yers    earn~yers   
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)   
                                                              
. esttab, star ( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 ) compress
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Estimations: Number and Earnings of Lawyers (Total Punitive Damages and Alltorts)  
 
  
. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                        
N                500          500          500          500          501          501   
                                                                                        
             (-0.06)       (0.40)      (-0.61)      (-0.40)      (-0.01)       (0.20)   
_cons         -0.116        0.741       -1.574       -1.007      -0.0944        2.370   
                          (-0.62)                   (-0.19)                   (-1.94)   
Alltort                 -0.000610                 -0.000247                   -0.0207*  
             (-0.03)      (-0.46)       (0.56)       (0.34)       (0.33)       (0.12)   
year       -0.0000238    -0.000404     0.000685     0.000405      0.00166     0.000624   
             (-1.34)      (-1.48)      (-1.27)      (-1.33)                             
stateid    -0.000306    -0.000295    -0.000340    -0.000315                             
             (-1.62)                   (-1.21)                   (-3.15)                
TotalPun~e  -0.00566                  -0.00531                   -0.0610***             
              (0.46)                    (0.56)                       (.)                
comp_fault   0.00137                   0.00205                         0                
              (0.78)                   (-0.22)                   (-1.06)                
patientc~d   0.00566                  -0.00186                   -0.0346                
             (-1.27)                   (-0.99)                   (-0.72)                
joint_se~l  -0.00898                  -0.00871                   -0.0262                
             (-0.70)                    (0.38)                    (4.67)                
continge~e  -0.00507                   0.00334                     0.126***             
              (1.11)                    (0.55)                    (0.37)                
periodic~t   0.00411                   0.00252                   0.00610                
             (-0.27)                   (-0.13)                    (1.31)                
collater~e  -0.00210                  -0.00126                    0.0450                
             (-0.38)                    (0.27)                       (.)                
total_da~s  -0.00435                   0.00368                         0                
              (0.45)                    (0.77)                   (-1.04)                
nonecono~s   0.00289                   0.00602                   -0.0483                
              (4.91)       (4.90)       (2.68)       (2.84)      (-1.39)      (-1.13)   
bankrupt~d    0.0360***    0.0330***    0.0254***    0.0256***   -0.0203      -0.0166   
              (3.46)       (3.74)       (2.55)       (2.82)       (0.04)       (0.31)   
insuranc~s    0.0363***    0.0356***    0.0328**     0.0346***   0.00129       0.0119   
              (0.69)       (0.91)       (0.57)       (0.70)      (-0.19)      (-0.30)   
numberfi~s    0.0151       0.0182       0.0151       0.0188      -0.0616      -0.0955   
             (-1.73)      (-2.39)      (-1.96)      (-2.09)      (-0.75)      (-0.70)   
divorce      -0.0292*     -0.0366**    -0.0391*     -0.0396**    -0.0420      -0.0453   
              (0.14)      (-0.52)       (1.10)       (0.66)       (0.53)       (0.31)   
prop_crime   0.00225     -0.00695       0.0230       0.0127       0.0477       0.0248   
             (-1.18)      (-0.77)      (-0.98)      (-0.77)       (1.10)       (1.70)   
violent_~e   -0.0121     -0.00698      -0.0122     -0.00924       0.0553       0.0802*  
              (3.21)       (2.95)       (2.80)       (2.89)       (0.05)      (-0.16)   
realgdp_~p    0.0786***    0.0663***    0.0811***    0.0780***   0.00727      -0.0221   
             (-3.76)      (-4.31)      (-2.90)      (-3.01)       (3.52)       (3.23)   
L3_alt_e~2    -0.159***    -0.164***    -0.155***    -0.146***     0.192***     0.198***
            (107.53)     (113.09)      (93.30)      (95.93)      (-0.15)      (-0.13)   
Lag1numb~s     0.981***     0.984***     0.970***     0.970***   -0.0120      -0.0104   
                                                                                        
           number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    number_~s    earn~yers    earn~yers   
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)   
                                                                                        
. esttab, star ( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 ) compress
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This paper investigates the determinants of the market for lawyers with a focus on demand 
variables including tort reform laws. In this study, I used the Feasible Generalized Least Squared 
method and a Panel Corrected Standard Error method, with year and State identifiers applied to a 
panel of U.S states, to estimate the determinants of the Number of Lawyers. I also used the Fixed 
Effect model with year and state identifiers to evaluate the effects of these determinants on the 
Earnings of Lawyers. 
The findings show that the Lagged Number of Lawyers and the Lagged Alternative 
Earnings are both significant non-tort determinants of the Number of Lawyers. Other non-tort 
determinants such as Real GDP per Capita, Divorce Rate, the Amount of Insurance Losses per 
Registered Vehicle, and the Number of Bankruptcy Filed at the Federal District Courts have 
negligible impacts. I also found evidence that the three year lagged of the Earnings of Alternative 
Professions is the only non-tort determinant that has a significant increasing impact on the 
Earnings of Lawyers. Additionally, I found no evidence that any of the tort reforms affect the 
Number of Lawyers.   
95 
 
 
 
However, I found that Split Recovery Rule and Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule 
significantly decreased the Earnings of Lawyers although Contingency Fee Rule increased the 
earnings of Lawyers.  
I further investigated the impact of passing all three Punitive Damages reforms and all tort 
reforms. I found that states that passed all three Punitive Damages reforms or all tort reforms 
experienced no change in the Number of Lawyers although the Earnings of Lawyers significantly 
decreased. However, the individual impacts of these reforms seem larger than their combined 
effects. This may be because Split Recovery and Punitive Damages (Evidence) Rule are picking 
up the impact of previously implemented Caps on Punitive Damages. Perhaps, different reforms 
such as Contingency Fee Rule that increases the Earnings of Lawyers, are being offset by other 
reforms such as the Split Recovery that decreases the Earnings of Lawyers. In any case, the 
combined negative effects of tort reforms are greater than their combined positive effects on the 
market for lawyers.  
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